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Climate change is increasingly being viewed through the lens of security, with expectations 
that climate impacts will foment instability and conflicts. This thesis investigates how climate 
change is interpreted as a security problem in the United Nations Security Council, and 
whether and how the attempts to define climate change as a security issue are challenging 
and transforming existing security logics. In international relations, the security agenda is 
traditionally associated with exceptionalism and logic of war, which are feared to spread in 
non-traditional sectors through ‘securitization’ of non-traditional security issues such as the 
environment. The thesis suggests that the securitization of climate change does not only carry 
a risk of expanding the military logic into the environmental sphere, but also inholds a 
possibility of a change in security logic itself. Climate security demands a global stance on 
security policies, which must be based on comprehensive peace building that acknowledges 
the diversifying needs of societies. Climate change is seen to bring about increase in global 
instability that is an outcome of both social and environmental disruption resulting from 
changing climate. Drawing on poststructuralist and discourse theoretical framework the thesis 
explores the meaning and function of climate security in the process of re-articulation of the 
security sphere within the United Nations Security Council.  Climate change is conceived as a 
multiplier, root cause and existential threat, which must be secured against through 
continuous and global process of adaptation that reduces the negative impacts, and works as 
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“We, the human species, are confronting a planetary emergency – a threat to the survival 
of our civilization that is gathering ominous and destructive potential even as we gather 
here. But there is hopeful news as well: we have the ability to solve this crisis and avoid 
the worst – though not all – of its consequences, if we act boldly, decisively and quickly.” 
(Al Gore 2007.) 
The same year the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) and former US Vice president Al Gore for their efforts in obtaining and 
disseminating information on climate change, the United Nation Security Council held its first 
formal meeting on climate change. There were clear sings, not only of the growing public and 
political attention to climate change in general, but to its security implications (Rothe 2016, 
17; Scott 2012, 221). Even as the security considerations of environmental change have roots 
at least to 1970’s (Barnett 2001, 3), the considerations of climate change as a security problem 
on its own terms, is relatively recent (see e.g. Rothe 2016; Trombetta 2008). Since the 2007, 
when the first meeting on security implications of climate change was held in the United 
Nations Security Council, the number of international actors framing climate change as a 
security issue has increased. In 2007, European Commission presented ‘Energy and Climate 
package’ that highlighted the energy security impacts of climate change, and adopted the 
“climate change and international security” process later in 2009 (Trombetta 2008, 398; Rothe 
2016, 135). In 2015 the United States Department of Defense released a report entitled the 
“National Security Implications of Climate-Related Risks and a Changing Climate” (US 
Department of Defense 2015). 
To the agenda of the United Nations Security Council climate change rise again in 2011, with 
hopes that the Council would bring urgency and political momentum to the matter after world 
leaders achieving only unambitious climate agreements (Cousins 2013, 196–195). Even as the 
Security Council’s debates did not result a resolution, it is becoming clear that climate change 
cannot be ignored in security policies. Climate change is estimated to have worldwide effects, 
not just on environment, but on economy and energy security, provoking large scale human 
suffering and outset of conflicts (Stern 2009). The acknowledgement of social systems 





This thesis examines the construction of a climate security discourse within the United Nations 
Security Council, and analyses how climate change is conceived as an international security 
threat. Even more so, the thesis seeks to investigate how the security framing of climate 
change challenges the traditional military understanding of security. I argue that the more 
security is conceived in military terms, the more threatening climate change gets. If the social 
changes caused by climate change are approached through traditional military based 
understanding of security, the accelerating pace of changes project quite a hopeless view. For 
this reason, it is important to study the possibilities of changes in the traditional understanding 
of security.  
This thesis approaches security as discursive practice rather than as a value or a state to be 
achieved, as it is conceived in traditional realist security studies. Building on poststructuralist 
and post-Marxist theory that has roots in French philosophy, the thesis presents an 
understanding of what is the security climate change is threatening, and how this 
understanding is challenging the traditional definition of security. The thesis suggests that 
climate security is emptied of any particular content and encompasses a chain of multiple 
demands and meanings that have been brought into an equivalential relation. Climate security 
is presented as a common good of humanity, demanding change in security thinking. In the 
contemporary world that is defined as more interdependent, complex and dangerous than 
ever before, the traditional security establishment is seen insufficient. Changes in the 
environmental and social structures have brought new demands and articulations to the 
discourse(s) of security that emphasizes global perspective and multitudinous risks faced by 
populations.  
As a global security governance structure the United Nations Security Council forms an 
interesting object to study the understanding of security in international politics. It may not 
be the first forum to reveal the discursive changes, but as highly institutionalized, it offers an 
important one. During the last couple decades, the Security Council has been under increased 
demand for reform that would update the Council to better reflect the changed security 
realities. Global character of non-traditional security threats, such as climate change, that 
have become increasingly significant in maintaining international peace and security, are seen 







Climate seems to be more politicized today than ever before. In 2000, an atmospheric chemist 
Paul Crutzen suggested that humanity had entered into a new era of the Anthropocene, where 
the impact of human activity is having a critical effect on the earth’s bio-physical system 
(Swyngedouw 2011, 253–254). Climate change represents one of the symptoms of this impact 
of human activity (IPCC 2014, 2). It is caused by greenhouse gas emissions that are largely by-
products of economic development (ibid., 4–5). Increasingly climate change is approached as 
a security problem in contemporary global politics. But no danger is an objective condition 
that exist independently of those who it is threatening (Campbell 1998, 1). Identifying a threat 
thus always comes with identifying those who are rendered secure. The ways in which climate 
change is conceptualized as a security problem are linked to the understandings of security 
(see e.g. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008). This thesis is an attempt to understand the ways in 
which the United Nations Security Council is interpreting climate change as a threat and 
constructing the meaning of security. Rather than defining security as an object of the world, 
this thesis conceives security through the lenses of critical security studies, as a politically and 
socially constructed phenomenon.  
Over the past few decades critical security studies have occupied a prominent place in 
International Relations and security studies. Critical security is an umbrella term for many 
theories of security that are characterized with a fundamental critique of epistemology and 
ontology of traditional approaches. (Browning & McDonald 2011, 236.) Poststructuralist 
approach of security, can be conceived belonging to the critical security family (Mutimer 2010, 
97). The poststructuralist approach opens up a possibility to study the process of change in 
the meaning of security. One well-known empirical work in poststructuralist security studies 
is written by David Campbell (1998), who explores how the identity of the United States is 
produced through discourses of danger. Campbell shows how the United States as a referent 
object and as an agent of security, is produced in its own practices.  
By using post-Marxian hegemony theory, I will consider how the context of climate change 
challenges and transforms the meanings associated with security. What I am interested in, is 
the intratextual characteristics of a single source, namely that of the United Nations Security 




How is climate change constructed as a threat in the United Nations Security Council, and how 
does it affect the traditional understanding of security? 
The structure of the thesis includes six parts. It will start with a brief introduction of the 
context of the United Nations, before presenting the research material. It will then move on 
to introduce the theoretical framing of this thesis, which consist of three different parts. First 
part presents the discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, which works as a 
backbone of the thesis. The second part of the theoretical discussion will consider the 
methodological side of the theory, and present the use of the methodology within the thesis. 
Last part of the theory frame will situate the thesis into security studies. Since tracing the 
genealogical roots of the climate change and security discourse would have expanded the 
thesis over its purpose, the presented security framework will introduce the debates 
identified as central genealogical ancestors to the climate security discourse in previous 
studies (see e.g. Rothe 2016; Oels 2012; McDonald 2013; Trombetta 2008). After theoretical 
discussion the results of the analysis are presented. The analysis section will first discuss how 
new meanings of security are established, after which moving to investigate how a hegemonic 
struggle is taking place. At the end of the analysis section a presidential statement adopted in 
2011, is separately discussed. I suggest that the presidential statement indicates the 
effectiveness of the hegemonic condensation that is taking place within the debates of the 
United Nations Security Council. The thesis will close with conclusion that argues that there is 
a minor shift occurring in security thinking from the international framing into a global one.  
The United Nations  
The United Nations is an international organization founded in 1945 by singing of the United 
Nations Charter, which guides the principles and purposes for the work of the organization. 
The establishment rose around the Declaration of United Nations drafted in 1942 by the Allies 
of Second World War. Currently the United Nations is made up of 193 member states and 
facilitates several specialized agencies, funds and programmes. The main organs of the UN 
established in the Charter are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council (inactive since 1994), the International Court 
of Justice, and the UN Secretariat. The main purpose of the organization is to promote 




The unique structure of the United Nations includes bodies led both by representatives of 
member states and staff representing the organization. The Secretary-General is a symbol of 
the United Nations and is described by the Charter as a chief administrative officer. The 
appointment of Secretary-General is done by the General Assembly upon the 
recommendation of the Security Council (Article 97 of the Charter). Since the beginning of the 
year 2017 the post has been occupied by Portuguese António Guterres. The Secretary-General 
can bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter he/she sees as a threat to the 
maintenance of international peace and security (Article 99 of the Charter). The Secretary-
General’s Report Climate change and its possible security implications (A/64/350 2009) 
conducted by the former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has been enjoying considerable 
attention within the debates on climate change held in the Security Council. Climate change 
was called by Ban Ki-moon the world’s greatest security threat, with the destructive potential 
of the Second World War (Rothe 2016, 135).  
The United Nations and Climate Change 
The United Nations has taken active role in addressing climate change. Some of the most 
notable efforts include the establishment of Intergovernmental panel on climate change 
(IPCC), and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) under 
which the yearly United Nations climate change conferences (COP) have been held since 1995. 
The COP meetings have resulted an adaptation of two notable agreements, the Kyoto Protocol 
in 1997 and Paris Agreement in 2016. The Kyoto commitment period of emission reduction 
ended in 2012, which created pressure for a new binding agreement. In the Paris Agreement 
member states agreed to aim at keeping global temperature rise, during this century, well 
below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (UNFCC 2017). The 2 degree rise is often 
recognized as a level after which the climate system, on which food production and other 
human activity is dependent, becomes dangerously disrupted (United Nations Foundation 
2017).   
The latest IPCC Assessment Report released in 2014 states that “[t]he precise levels of climate 
change sufficient to trigger abrupt and irreversible change remain uncertain, but the risk 
associated with crossing such thresholds increases with rising temperature”(IPCC 2014, 13). 
Climate change caused by anthropogenic emissions will, according to the report, further erode 




(IPCC 2014, 13–16). In 2009, the security implications of climate change were debated within 
General Assembly, which consist of all the member states of the UN. In this year’s World 
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, the Secretary-General addressed that “the best way 
to prevent crises and conflicts in today’s world” is  “the enhancement of a new generation of 
partnerships, partnerships not only with governments, not only with civil society and 
academia but equally partnerships with the business community in the context of the 
perspective of implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris 
Agreement on climate change, creating the conditions for an inclusive and sustainable 
development” (the United Nations 2017b).  In the Security Council climate change has been 




The research material is collected from the United Nations Official Document System that is 
publicly available on the United Nations website. The meeting records are selected by the 
theme, and conclude all the debates in which climate change forms the main or a major issue. 
This leaves out the meetings concerning of specific conflict situations where climate change is 
presented as a factor causing or exacerbating conflict. Concept notes, which are circulated 
before the meetings to present the agenda in concern, are included in the research material, 
together with a presidential statement that was adopted at the 6587th meeting held on 20 July 
20111.  
Climate change is debated as the main or a major concern within four meetings. The first of 
which was held in 2007 under the heading Energy, Security and Climate. Next two meetings 
were held in 2011, of which first under the heading Impact of climate change and second New 
challenges to international peace and security and conflict prevention. The fourth meeting in 
2015 concerned specifically Peace and security challenges facing small island developing 
States. Besides these meetings the UNSC has held two informal Arria Formula meetings about 
the security implications of climate change. These informal meetings are restricted from the 
                                                          




research material as there is no sufficient documentary or participatory list available of the 
meetings. The overall volume of research material contains 278 pages. 
The meetings were participated by all 15 member states of the UNSC, and a great and 
diversifying number of other representatives, who attend the meeting either for informing 
the Council for specific matters, or to participate as a specially affected member of the United 
Nations by the issue in concern2. The Security Council consist of 15 member states, of which 
10 are circulating in two years pace. In two of the meetings the circulating members were the 
same, but the debates were held under a different presidency. The presidency of the Council 
is held by each of the members in turn for one month, during which the member state is in 
the role of calling the meetings and approving the agendas taken into consideration (The 
United Nations 1983). The speeches of the representatives in all of the meetings were asked 
to be restricted to five minutes.   
The first meeting in 2007 was held under the presidency of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and was participated by 54 member states of the United Nations. 
The second meeting was called upon by Germany with composition of 64 representatives. This 
was the only meeting that resulted adaptation of a presidential statement. What needs to be 
taken into account, is that the other participants of the meetings beside the members of the 
Council, can only take part without a right to vote.  The Council thus represents a highly 
exclusive organ of the United Nations. The third meeting held under the presidency of 
Portugal was the most limited by the number of participants and included only three invited 
representatives of states. The fourth meeting was participated by a great number of 
representatives, of which many small island states. The meeting was scheduled by presidency 
of New Zealand and invited 56 additional member states to take part in discussion.  
As a non-inclusive and state-centered organ, the Security Council highly represents the 
international order prevailing at the time of establishment in 1945. There have been many 
attempts and pressure to reform the Council, but no significant achievements have been 
accomplished. Thus the Security Council offers a relevant platform for studying the potential 
transformation in the understanding of the meaning of security. The council is given the 
                                                          
2 Rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure gives right to any member of the United Nations to 
apply for a participation to debate without a vote. The rule 39 enables the Council to invite other participants it 




primary responsibility in maintenance of international peace and security in the United 
Nations Charter and is the only organ of which resolutions are binding for all the members of 
the United Nations, which today is meaning almost all the states in the World3.  Surely, the 
Council is not the only forum that can potentially reflect the changes in security thinking on a 
global scale, but as a highly institutionalized entity, it offers a meaningful one.   
 
Theoretical Framing  
 
A starting point of this thesis is an understanding of all meanings being discursively 
constructed. What this means is that, the ways in which we understand climate change, what 
is included or excluded, what is understood as the causes and effects, or what action, if any, 
should be taken, are all discursively formed. Rather than climate change as an externally 
occurring event, it is the meanings and understandings given to it that are making the 
difference in the actions taken. For example, understanding climate change either as a natural 
phenomenon or as an outcome of human activity have different kind of effects on the actions 
that are seen as most convenient in tackling the issue. What this also means, is that security 
has no universal essence, but only discursively formed meanings that are more or less 
institutionalized. In following section I will introduce the theoretical and methodological 
toolbox of this thesis, which builds strongly on the poststructuralist and post-Marxist 
discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.  
 
Discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe 
The theory of Laclau and Mouffe is best known from their ground-breaking work published in 
1985, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. The aim of the authors was to overcome the 
explanatory impasse they saw had reached the classical Marxian theorization. The inability of 
classical Marxism to explain the new social movements and transformations made the authors 
reject the essentialism they saw as the main problem in classical Marxism. Instead of taking 
Marxian notions such as ‘class’ and ‘base’’ for granted, Laclau and Mouffe wanted to see how 
                                                          





the meaning of these notions were established and maintained, and to “revive the 
preconditions which make their discursive operation possible” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985/2001, 
viii). Critically drawing on structuralist, poststructuralist and Marxist writers, such as Ferdinand 
de Saussure, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Louis Althusser and especially on Antonio 
Gramsci, the authors extended discourse theory to cover all social practice and phenomena. 
Through deconstruction and strict scrutinizing of works of various Marxian theorists, whom 
themselves had also engaged in overcoming the impasse of which the intellectual tradition 
had found itself, the authors were able to reveal the plurality of Marxian thinking and the 
primacy of politics in the social world.  
For Laclau and Mouffe, it was not the transcendental class subject, but radical contingency of 
meaning that offered the explanation for the new social movements, such as new forms of 
feminism, anti-institutional ecology struggles and protests of sexual minorities on the 
capitalist periphery, and constituted a new ontological understanding of the social (Laclau & 
Mouffe 2001).  Social, in the theory of Laclau and Mouffe, is a purely discursive space 
structured by partial fixations of meaning. Any social phenomena is never fully completed or 
total, but under a constant threat of rearticultion. As a result there is constant social struggle 
over the definitions of society and identity. For the authors, and against the central idea of 
classical Marxism, universality can only exist in the form of hegemony, that is, as a political 
construction where particularity is transformed into the representation of a universality 
(Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 119, 125–127; Laclau 2014, 6).  
I will next go bit more in detail with the ontological assumptions, theoretical concepts and 
methodological precepts prevailing within the discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe, and in works inspired by their theory. As it is the poststructuralist critique of 
structuralist linguistics and critics of classical Marxism that play the constitutive role in the 
theory of Laclau and Mouffe, I will start by introducing the poststructuralist understanding of 
discourse as advocated within the theory, and by briefly going through the critics of classical 
Marxist central for the theory.  
 
Poststructuralist discourse 





From a poststructuralist perspective discourses are not reducible to the realm of language, 
but are understood as a relational complex of signifying sequences where language and 
pragmatic aspect of action have been temporarily woven together to form a totality, namely 
that of the discourse (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 93; Rothe 2016, 50–51). This means that not only 
sematic aspects of language but pragmatic aspects of action, by impacting to the relational 
structures of meaning, constitute the world we are living. Discourse is the primary terrain of 
the constitution of any objectivity, not in terms of that there is no world external to thought, 
but in the sense that no meaning pre-exist the relational complex (Laclau 2005, 68; Laclau & 
Mouffe 2001, 94–95).  
This all-encompassing understanding of discourse steam from the linguistic structuralism of 
Ferninand de Saussure. In his structuralist theory of language Saussure argued that meaning 
comes into being from the possibility of linguistic signs to be determined by a mutual but 
negative relationship. What this means is, that the object’s meaning is not determined by any 
external factor, but is an outcome of the relationship in a linguistic structure where the sign’s 
meaning comes into being from its difference of other sings, such as ‘a dog’ not being ‘a cat’ 
or ‘a mouse’ (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 9–10; Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 99). Language is “a 
closed system of elements and rules that could be described quite independently from the 
psychological subjectivity of any particular user of that language” (Radford & Radford 2005, 
61). According to Saussure, this structure is synchronic, and consist of a combination of two 
elements, those of signifiers and signified. Signifier refers to the material aspect of a sign and 
signified to the concept or idea associated with the signifier. These two elements are 
connected arbitrarily in the frames of prevailing cultural context. (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 
10–11.) Put differently, the image of an object we have of any particular sing is an outcome of 
what social convention has taught us.  For Saussure the relationship between signifier and 
signified, once established, becomes fixed and thus enables collective and common 
understanding and use of concepts. This is the main point of poststructuralist critic, as for 
poststructuralists there is not just one general system of meaning, but the meaning can 
change when moved from one discourse to the other (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 12). 
Poststructuralists reject the distinction between the two levels of language, langue and parole, 
as suggested by Saussure. For Saussure langue is the structure of language consisted by the 




peoples mistakes (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 10–12; Torfing 1999, 87). For poststructuralists 
it is exactly the concrete language use and social practices where the structure is created, 
reproduced and transformed.  
What was defined by Saussure as a mistake of a speaker, represents the crucial feature of 
radical contingency of meaning for poststructuralists. There is no exhaustive, fully constituted 
context, nor can the performative action to be reduced to the intentions of an articulator, but 
the meaning must be understood as a pattern of repeated articulations (Rothe 2016, 55–56; 
Howarth 2000, 39–40). In other words, it is the repetition that forms the meaning.  
What follows is, that for poststructuralists there clearly are structures, but these structures 
are not necessary (in the particular way) or fixed. The signs still acquire their meaning by being 
relational and different from each other, but how the sings differ can vary depending on the 
context in which they are used (e.g. Burr 2015, 63; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 10–11; Laclau & 
Mouffe 2001, 99–100.)  Like it is greatly elucidated by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, 11) with 
an example of the sign ‘work’: 
[T]he word ‘work’ can, in certain situations, be the opposite of ‘leisure’ whereas, 
in other contexts, its opposite is ‘passivity’ (as in ‘work in the garden’). It does 
not follow that words are open to all meanings – that would make language and 
communication impossible – but it does have the consequence that words 
cannot be fixed with one or more definitive meaning(s). 
The absence of transcendental signified and the impossibility of ultimate fixation necessitates 
a partial fixation resulting that “[a]ny discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the 
field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a center” (ibid., 98–99). Like 
it is stated by Laclau and Mouffe (2001, 98) “in order to differ, to subvert meaning, there has 
to be a meaning”. 
In the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe these partial fixations of meanings are called 
‘nodal points’. (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 91–100.)  Nodal points are the created centers that 
determines the structure of every discourse, and which in the face of absent transcendental 
signifier, prevents the authors from falling from the problems of foundationalism to the 
problems of anti-foundationalism. As centers of any particular discourse, it is around these 
privileged signs that all the other signs acquire their meaning and creates the structure of a 
discourse.  (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 98–100) Like ‘a body’ in medical discourse or ‘democracy’ 




The primacy of political  
The radical contingency of meanings and discourse as the primary terrain of the constitution 
of objectivity as such, implies that the political has a primacy over the social (Marchart 2007, 
151: Laclau 2014, 7). This is because as a temporal totality discourse is always an outcome of 
exclusions i.e. political struggles. Like it is explained by Laclau (2005/2007, 69–70):  
[T]o grasp that totality conceptually, we have to grasp its limits – that is to say, 
we have to differentiate it from something other than itself. This other, however, 
can only be another difference, and since we are dealing with totality that 
embraces all differences, this other difference – which provides the outside that 
allows us to constitute the totality – would be internal, not external, to the latter- 
that is to say, it would be unfit for totalizing job. So […] the outside is not simply 
one more, neutral element but an excluded one, something that the totality 
expels from itself in order to constitute itself.  
That is to say, that the identity of any given object is constituted through articulated exclusion 
of what it is not, as for example a society can reach its sense of cohesion by demonization of 
a section of the population (ibid., 70). It is the practice of articulation that establishes the 
relation among elements modifying their identity and forming the temporally structured 
totality of a discourse. But like it is emphasized in the theorization of one the most well-known 
poststructuralist, Michel Foucault, this articulation does not happen randomly as the subject 
of the articulation is itself an outcome of discursive practices (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 14). 
The subjectivity of an agent is “penetrated by the same precariousness and absence of suture 
apparent at any other point of the discursive totality of which it is part” (Laclau and Mouffe 
2001, 108).  The poststructuralist subject is always a split subject (Torfing 2005, 17), or in the 
terms of Foucault ‘decentered’ (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 14). The subject may attempt to 
reconstruct a full identity through the acts of identification, but as a discursive position, can 
never achieve a fully structured identity.    
This understanding of a discourse as primary terrain of social, and of subject as a discursive 
subject position, have effects on the way poststructuralism approaches the notion of power 
(see e.g. Marchart 2007, 146–149). Unlike in conventional approaches to power where power 
is defined as a commodity or a possession of a subject, poststructuralism sees power as 





What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it 
does not only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and 
produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It 
needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole 
social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. 
(Foucault 1980, 119 cited in Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 13.) 
Power works inherently in the field of meaning-making and manifests itself in the structures 
of discourses. It is around this fundamentally political character of all social systems Laclau 
and Mouffe evolves their political theory of discourse by introducing the concepts of social 
antagonism and hegemony.  
 
Critique of Classical Marxism 
The book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy starts with a genealogy of the concept of 
hegemony. Genealogy as a method of study is perhaps best known through the work of 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. Genealogy builds on poststructuralist premises 
emphasizing and exposing power-knowledge relations. It focuses on the processes by which 
meanings are constructed and contested in by and for particular representations of the past, 
which in turn, are shaping and limiting our contemporary understanding (Devetak 2009, 185). 
So rather than giving their contribution to the reading of Karl Marx’s Capital, the authors by 
following and radicalizing the idea of ‘sedimentation’ and ‘reactivation’ presented by Edmund 
Husserl, deconstructed the Marxist categories and revealed the contingent character of 
Marxian trait (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, viii–ix).  It was the work of Antonio Gramsci that provided 
a needed arsenal of concept and theorization for Laclau and Mouffe to advance their own 
theory.  
Departing from the classical Marxism’s perceivance of ideology as a cloaking of reality, and 
imposing a false consciousness that covers up the reality of social life, enabling the exploitative 
social structures, Gramsci sees ideologies being the constructing factor behind class 
consciousness - or in the terms of Gramsci, behind ‘collective wills’. For Gramsci, ideologies 
‘organise’ human masses, and create the terrain on which people act and acquire the 
consciousness of their position and struggle.  Ideologies, in terms of Gramsci, can be identified 
as “commonsensensical conceptions of the world, which are ‘implicitly manifest in art, law, in 




be divorced from social practices as an imaginary mental representation (Howarth 2000, 89). 
This means that ideologies are bound to social practices, as at the same time social activity is 
in itself a product of ideology. In short, hegemony for Gramsci represents “the articulation of 
different forces by the working class, in which the proletariat transcends its corporate 
interests and represents the universal interests of ‘the people’ or ‘nation’” (Howarth & 
Stavrakakis 2000, 22). Hegemony is thus more of a general political logic to construct a new 
'intellectual, cultural and moral leadership' and to establish a ‘historical bloc’, than just an 
instrumental political strategy of political leaders (ibid.). In the Gramsci’s concept of 
hegemony the direction or identity of elements are not seen as dialectically determined like 
they were in previous versions of Marxism, but the all-exhaustive and essential class subjects 
are replaced with the idea of the identity of the class subjects being an outcome of various 
relations that do not themselves have a class character. (Laclau 1988, 252.) That is why 
Gramsci saw the project of society as a construction of an ‘integral state’ – which was the 
process of hegemony – instead of ‘withering away’ of the state as it was presented in the 
theory of Marx (Laclau 2014, 6).  
It was this replacement of class-reductionist perspective with a dependency on hegemonic 
articulation what Laclau and Mouffe find most central in the theorization of Gramsci. This 
replacement opened up the possibility to approach power as purely relational and helped to 
explain the plurality of social struggles that had been problematic from the view point of 
classical Marxism (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 58-59).  In the gramscian approach, people’s 
consciousness gains a degree of autonomy as the power of the ruling class cannot be 
exhaustively explained by an economically determined ideology, but ideologies – as 
hegemonic articulations – are sites of meaning-making, and thus, the working class is able to 
rebel against and change the organization of a society. However, this dependency of 
hegemonic articulation in the work of Gramsci maintained the ultimate ontological foundation 
of a class structure, as it argued that there must always be a single unifying principle in every 
hegemonic formation – which can only be a fundamental class – even as the elements now 
had a merely relational identity (ibid., 59). This was because social struggle could only occur 
in the necessary structural framework of class character (ibid.).  
To that end, Gramsci came close to poststructuralist stance seeing the construction of 




ultimate grounding structure as “the constitutive logic of the economic space is not itself 
hegemonic” but “a homogeneous space unified by necessary laws” (ibid., 59–60).  In 
overcoming this essentialist character of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe radicalized the 
Althusser’s notion of overdetermination. For Althusser, every social relation is 
overdetermined, which means that unlike in classical Marxism, social relations “lack an 
ultimate literality which would reduce them to necessary moments of an immanent law” and 
the social “constitutes itself as a symbolic order” (ibid., 84). In other words, society and social 
agents lack any essence, and form “relative and precarious forms of fixation” that are behind 
the establishment of a certain social order (ibid., 84). The identity of a social agent or any 
totality, is an outcome of diverse and contested interpellations or hailings, where ideology 
recruits us to act as its agents. For example, the social agent can be hailed (interpellated) as 
the member of family, of social class, of a nation and of a race, forming a complex ensemble 
of overdetermined (and symbolic) subject positions through which to act (Mouffe 1979, 171-
172). As Althusser takes society, due to the process of overdetermination, to comprise a 
complex structured whole, Laclau and Mouffe abandoned the society as a sutured space, and 
argued that society only exist as an attempt to constitute a fixation. (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 
83, 100). 
Every social order, for Laclau and Mouffe, is the result of hegemony produced through political 
articulation. Articulation referring to any practice that establishes a relation among elements 
in such a way that their identity is modified. In order to speak of hegemony, the articulation 
must take place “through a confrontation with antagonistic articulatory practices”, and 
presupposes the presence of floating elements of which can be articulated by these opposed 
political projects (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 122; Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000, 22). Hegemonic 
formation, is thus, the outcome of hegemonic articulatory practices that institutes nodal 
points delimited by antagonistic political frontiers, and implying the openness of social.   
 
The political discourse theory as a methodological tool 
 
Like stated before, in the history of Marxian thinking it was Gramsci who, for Laclau and 




poststructuralism the impasse of explanatory power of Left-wing thinking, in the face of new 
social movements, could be overcame.  These new movements and transformations could not 
be explained by a universal class identity or by the historically determined antagonistic class 
struggle, but should be understood as hegemonic struggles that manifest the openness of the 
social. For Laclau and Mouffe hegemonic struggle is possible precisely because social systems 
are articulated systems where elements are not determined but can be rearticulated in a 
different way (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 108).  The identity of a political subject, like social 
antagonism, is always rooted in political discourse that forms a relational system of diverging 
societal needs and political demands (Rothe 2016, 69). It is when a particular political demand 
manages through the equivalential chain to assume the representation of a common or 
universal interest – i.e. particularity is transformed to the representation of a universality – 
the hegemonic relation is formed. Hegemony thus implies a very specific kind of conditions of 
possibility that necessitates the existence of antagonistic forces and instability of the dividing 
political frontiers between them (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 120–131).  
Antagonism rises as two different identities mutually exclude each other.  The inability of a 
subject to construct a full identity forms the precondition for a antagonism, but the 
identification with various different subject positions do not necessarily lead into antagonistic 
relation. This is because antagonism is the interruption or failure of the constitution of a full 
identity. Like it is illustrated by Laclau with an example of a Spartan mother whose identity as 
a mother is interrupted by a death of her son in a battlefield. As a result of the death, survival 
of the son becomes a symbol of an unreachable full identity (mother) and the enemy army 
can be transformed into a symbol of her non-being, what brings us to the field of social 
antagonism. (Laclau 2014, 108–114.) Thus antagonism is a relation wherein the limits of any 
objectivity is shown, representing the threats of the discursive objectivity (Laclau 2014, 110–
125). It is between this representation of common or universal good and production of 
common enemy i.e. antagonism, that the hegemony in the political discourses steams from.  
Through the chain of equivalence different societal demands can be united under a hegemonic 
demand — i.e. an empty signifier — that represents them all. Empty signifier represents the 
attempt to “fill” the unavoidable lack of full closure of the social, or in the words of Laclau 
(1996, 53), “although the fullness and universality of society is unachievable, its need does not 




(impossible) ideal of fullness that society is organized (ibid.). The equivalence of demands is 
created against their common antagonistic forces that divides the social space into two 
opposite poles. The equivalence represents the purely negative element, the common threat 
that is found in all the identities and demands, that establishes the constitutive split (Laclau 
1990, 14). As a contrast to the logic of equivalence, there is the logic of difference that 
attempts to break the chains of equivalence by enhancing the differences and by trying to 
relegate the antagonistic divisions into the margins of society (Howarth 2000, 107; Laclau & 
Mouffe 2001, 113–120). Hegemony creates a partial totalization that, as well as all social 
identity, necessarily operates within the tension of these two opposite logics (Laclau 2005, 
78). 
By following these two logics, two different forms of hegemonic project can be analytically 
distinguished. These are an offensive and defensive forms of hegemony.  In the offensive form 
hegemony political practice follows the logic of equivalence linking together disparate 
demands to form a ‘discourse coalitions’ by which to overcome the antagonistic enemy.  This 
coalition building creates new discourses whose demands and subject positions needs to be 
accepted by wide part of political community. The aim of this form of hegemony is to challenge 
and overcome the existing hegemonic order. On the contrary, the defensive form of hegemony 
tries to maintain and secure the existing hegemonic structures. Based on the logic of 
difference, the defensive form of hegemony tries to channel the social demands and 
grievances into forms that do not challenge the existing hegemony through consensual 
narratives and separation of different demands and grievances. This form of power can also 
use the means of adopting some of the demands of opposite discourse coalitions which leads 
to breaking of the chain of equivalence and weakens its power. (Rothe 2016, 71–72.)  But as 
stated before, hegemony is always necessarily operating within the tension of these two 
logics, as in order to grasp a totality – which is the condition for signification as such – there 
always needs to be something that is other and excluded from the totality itself. And as all 
that is excluded share the same equivalence of exclusion, it necessarily prevents the total 
equivalence as well as total difference (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 113–116, 120; Laclau 1990, 69–
70).  
Chris Methmann (2010) has used the concept of empty signifier in analyzing how existing 




consensual narratives, in his study of climate mainstreaming. Methmann argues that through 
governmentality international organizations – in his study WTO, IMF, WB and OECD – manage 
to integrate climate protection into prevailing hegemonic order without really changing the 
basic social structures. The discursive strategies of globalism, scientism, growth ethics and 
efficiency promote the idea of governmentality in the name of climate protection, allowing 
organizations to appear as climate protectors without the need of the structure of world 
economy to be changed but allowed the continuation of ‘business as usual’. (Methmann 
2010.) The concept of governmentality Methmann uses in his study comes from the writings 
of Michel Foucault.  Governmentality is often understood as ‘the conduct of conduct’ and ‘art 
of government’, referring to the process through which government, as a form of power based 
on the conduct of people, has evolved to work as the modus of political rule. 
In bit different vein, Magdalena Kuchler and Johan Hedrén (2016) have studied bioenergy as 
an empty signifier, reviling how the existing hegemonic formation is defended through chain 
of equivalence. According to Kuchler and Hedrén the concept of bioenergy is through the 
chain of equivalence rendered under the hegemonic thread attempting to suture its 
signification through “the logic of a capitalist market economy fixated on economic growth 
and capital accumulation” (Kuchler & Hedrén 2016, 245). They studied the conceptualization 
of bioenergy in central documents of three influential international organizations – the 
International Energy Agency, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization. They approach energy insecurity, climate change, and 
agricultural stagnation as organic crisis, or in the words of Laclau and Mouffe (2001, 122) as 
“generalized crisis of social identities” and “proliferation of antagonisms”, that they saw 
challenging the existing hegemonic order, and argued that bioenergy through chain of 
equivalence is rendered under the hegemonic thread to offer a “win-win-win solution” to the 
crisis (ibid., 239–243). The authors also reveal how internal dislocations and contradictions are 
contesting the coherence and relevance of bioenergy as a solution to all the demands of the 
crisis, which leads to ‘emptying’ the particular meanings of the concept of bioenergy and 
producing it as an empty signifier (Kuchler & Hedrén 2016, 243–245). The authors argue that  
the fixation of hegemonic system on economic growth and accumulation of capital enforces 




dislocations and constituting bioenergy “a futile solution to the challenges of energy 
insecurity, climate change, and agricultural crisis” (ibid., 237).  
 
Discursive struggle 
Like shown before, the hegemonic formations behind our knowledge, understanding, and 
ways of acting in the world, set politics as the process of instituting the social, and give political 
ontologically privileged role in the theory of Laclau and Mouffe.  The major aim of hegemonic 
projects is the construction and stabilizing systems of meaning, through the articulation of 
nodal points (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 98–99). Thus, hegemonic struggle is always the 
construction of the ‘the other’ as well as construction of the ‘we’. However, political as such 
does not require an antagonistic relation in the sense of friend/enemy distinction, but only 
“the ever present possibility of antagonism”, that means that there is always the constitutive 
outside in a terms of we/they and the possibility of it to turn into an antagonistic friend/enemy 
distinction if ‘they’ is perceived as putting into a question the identity and existence of the 
‘we’ (Mouffe 2005, 14–17). 
As the competition between different versions of the social antagonism and common good is 
in the heart of the political defined by Laclau and Mouffe (2001), the construction of social 
antagonism is not to be understood to mean a state of exception in terms of Carl Schmitt, or 
end of regular politics, but quite the opposite. Hegemonic project aims at this ‘naturalization’ 
or objectivecation, where the hegemonic formation is unquestionably taken as natural and 
true. The hegemonic formation is dislocated4 as it confronts new events it cannot domesticate 
and becomes disrupted by them. Dislocations are processes by which the contingency of 
discursive structures is made visible and leads to disruption of identities and discourses 
(Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000, 20). Dislocations also create a lack at the level of meaning and 
enable new discursive constructions that attempt to suture the dislocated discursive structure 
(ibid.). In other words, this process opens up the space for hegemonic struggle of “how to heal 
the rift in the social order”, and leads to new articulations of nodal points and antagonistic 
frontiers of the society (Torfing 2005, 17). The nodal points that manages to take the form of 
                                                          
4  Laclau (1998) distinguishes dislocation from social antagonism by setting social antagonism to be one way of 
responding to the dislocation. Dislocation refers to the impossibility of any discourse to provide a fixed 




empty universals, or in other words, empty signifiers, names the structure of hegemonic 
formation that has been constructed. (Ibid.; see also Howarth & Stavrakakis 2000, 20.)  
Laclau (1990) has further theorized this process of hegemonization by introducing the 
concepts of myth and social imaginary. Myths attempt to rearticulate the dislocated elements 
to form a new objectivity by forming a new space for representation. In international relations 
the nation-state is a widely recognized example of a myth (Erdogan 2017, 22). If myths 
manages to structure or ‘cover up’ the dislocation and incorporate variety of social demands 
they transforms into imaginaries. These social imaginaries are defined by Laclau (1990, 63) as 
‘a horizons’ or as ‘absolute limits which structures a field of intelligibility’. In the form of social 
imaginary, hegemony has achieved its most objective, or institutional form. The more 
objective social relations seems, the more ‘natural’ they appear.  
 
Discourse coalitions and storylines 
To gain more analytical clarity I have conciliated Maarten Hajer’s concepts of discourse 
coalition and storyline with Laclau and Mouffe’s chain of equivalence. The logic of equivalence 
is stressing the similarities of elements and seeking at dissolution of the differences by uniting 
them under the master signifier i.e. discursive nodal point.  Through declaring a common 
adversary or antagonism, frontier is established between this common enemy and the united 
elements, and variety of different demands can be brought together (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 
113–116; Howarth 2000, 107).  
Hajer defines storyline as ‘‘a condensed statement summarizing complex narratives, used by 
people as ‘short hand’ in discussions’’ (Hajer 2006, 69). It is possible for many actors to share 
same storylines with quite a lacking mutual understanding (ibid.). These storylines similarly to 
nodal points are dispersing differences and bringing together discourse coalitions that are 
giving a structure to a specific discourse. Discourse coalition refers to a group of actors who 
from different subject positions shares the usage of a particular set of storylines, and is this 
way brought together by a common orientation towards a particular problem (Hajer 2006, 70; 
Rothe 2016, 60, 72). Hegemonic project involves coalition building as through coalition 
building disparate discursive elements are fused into broader consensual storylines (Rothe 





Method applied in the thesis 
Discourse analysis is not a coherent method but an ensemble of approaches belonging to the 
field of qualitative analysis (Hajer 2005, 314). The basic assumption in discourse analytical 
approach is that language profoundly shapes our understanding of the world and reality. 
Discourse analysis provides a way to analyze discursive structures such as narratives, story 
lines and metaphors. It is also a methodologically sound way to analyze discursive production 
of a meaning and socio-political practices from which social constructs emerge. (Hajer 2006, 
66–67.) The methodological tools used in this thesis are constructed around the discourse 
theoretical framing presented in earlier in this chapter.  
My analytical focus here is a) the different meanings of climate security b) the discourses that 
inform these meanings c) the notions that constructing the discourses and their particular 
qualities and functions. The examination is done through textual analysis. A central aim of 
textual analysis in discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe is to locate and analyze the 
mechanisms by which meaning is produced, fixed and contested within particular texts in 
question (see Howarth 2005, 340). This can be done by examining what signs have a privileged 
status, and how are they defined in relation to the other sings.  
Following Martin Müller’s (2010) suggestion I distinguished three interdependent 
apparatuses: the discourse apparatus, the identity apparatus and the politics apparatus. The 
concepts of nodal point, floating signifier, articulation and field of discursivity, presented in 
this chapter, belong to the discourse apparatus. It conceptualizes the creation, transformation 
and fixation of meaning “through discourses within a hierarchical, relational and situationally 
contingent structure” (ibid.). By identifying nodal points, I was able trace the signification 
chains through investigating how they are combined with other signs. After identification of 
the discursive structures I could analyze the alternative ways of producing meaning of 
identified nodal points. The identity apparatus includes the concepts of subject position and 
split subject and investigates the different possibilities of constructing of meaning of a subject 
in a different discourses (ibid.). This is examining the process of identification and exclusion. 
Who is threatened, who is acting and who/what is threatening. The concepts of hegemony, 




of chains of equivalence and difference within hegemonic projects. How floating signifiers are 
fixed within discursive structures and how discourse coalitions are produced.  
All of the concepts presented above refer to key signifiers in the social organization of 
meaning, which by identifying from specific empirical material reveal how discourses, 
identities and social space are organized discursively (Jorgensen & Phillips 2010, 50). Through 




The contingency of meaning, as discussed above, is clearly seen in the concept of security. 
Within Security Studies there are multiple ways in which to define and approach security. 
These definitions, and the discourses they belong to, are embedded with different kind of 
premises and understandings of the world, and vary in their views of the legitimate objects of 
security, means to provide security and by the nature of threats. In the Charter of the United 
Nations signed in 1945, after devastating experiences of the Second World War, the 
maintenance of international peace and security was set as the primary target of the new 
founded organization. Security was seen mainly in the light of preventing major disputes and 
war between nation states, as the preamble of the Charter notes, the determination of the 
United Nations is to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (The UN Charter 
1945). The new challenges and threats posed by arising nuclear warfare and growing tension 
between the eastern and western blocks, after the end of the Second World War, created a 
need for more academic based military expertise and led to the emergence of Security Studies 
as a distinct field of study (Wӕver & Buzan 2010, 466–467).  
The discourse of security during the Cold War was dominated by the threats of arms race and 
deterrence theories, where the state was not seen only as the object to be secured but also 
gained new responsibility towards providing security for its own citizens in a more 
comprehensive manner (ibid.; Buzan 1997, 6). It was only after the tension between rivaling 
powers of the Cold War eased, that the focus of Security Studies significantly shifted away 
from the strategic manners —namely that of the study of the threat, use and control of 




environment and international economy. The end of the Cold War and widening of the 
security terrain were also seen in the work of the UNSC as the fading of numbing tension 
engendered new freedoms for the Council to act (The United Nations 2016). This newfound 
ability to act was seen in the rise of new principles and ideas, such as the humanitarian 
intervention and ‘responsibility to protect’, which according to Juergen Dedring (2004) are 
interconnected with increased influence of the idea of human security within the UNSC 
framework.  
However, there was a great number of scholars that at least since the 1970s had been 
persistently emphasizing the inability of traditional security discourse to manage 
environmental risks such as environmental degradation.  In these arguments it is environment 
that is seen as the most pressing source of threats. It is rather the environmental degradation 
and hazardous pollution than military attack that is forming a threat to security.  Many of 
these authors seek to reorient security studies by demonstrating how it is the material well-
being rather than abstraction like “the state” that is in fact threatened. National sovereignty 
is considered less important than the well-being of individuals or the species, as the national 
security itself is highly dependent on the well-being of the citizens and environment. (Krause 
& Williams 1996, 233–234.) Recently the environmental security discourse has increasingly 
been coalesced with human security approach.  
Human security is often defined as an alternative approach to state-centric security, as it shifts 
the focus on individuals as referent objects.  Human security pays attention to insecurities 
people suffers within states, and according to Pauline Kerr (2010, 122), “continues to drive 
the very old political philosophy of liberalism, which places people and the individual at its 
epicenter and prescribes some necessary conditions, such as freedom and equality, for people 
to be secure”. The concept of human security became into prominence after the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published the Human Development Report in 1994, 
and was right from the start a very much part of the so called “wide” versus “narrow” debate 
characterizing security studies. Matthew et. all (2009, 5–10) point out in their comprehensive 
study of environmental change and human security, that even as the discourse on human 
security came to challenge the state-centrism, it is internally very much divided by the stances 
on how broadly security should be approached. The proponents of broad conceptions of 




governance, when as advocates of narrow conception see this as unhelpful since “[a] concept 
that aspires to explain almost everything in reality explains nothing”, why the approach should 
focus only in “the freedom from fear” and not to “the freedom from want” (Mack 2004, 367; 
see also Matthew et. all 2009, 5–10).  
One attempt to construct a conceptualization of security with more analytical validity comes 
from the so called Copenhagen School. The school approaches security as ‘survival’, stating 
that “when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated object” it 
becomes a security issue and legitimatizes the use of extraordinary measures (Buzan et. all 
1998, 21).  It is through speech act that an issue can be lifted from being an issue of ‘lower’ 
politics into a concern of ‘high’ politics – or above politics – i.e. as security issue. Security in 
this way, is a particular type of politics applicable to wide range of issues.  (Buzan et. all 1998, 
vii, 21–26; Emmers 2010, 137–138.)  Today, the analytical framework offered by the school 
has become widely used in studies of security and international relations.  It has also provoked 
notable criticism and further theorizations. From the point of view of this thesis the most 
prominent one coming from the field of poststructuralism5. 
 
Traditional security discourse  
Prior to the expanding of the definition of security— and in large extent regardless of it— 
security was understood as “military protection against the threats posed by the armed forces 
of others states” (Sheenan 2010, 172). Kenneth Waltz argued in 1979 that the interactions 
between states is always based on ensuring their own survival (Glaser 2010, 20). The sovereign 
state is seen as the legitimate object of security as well as the principal actor in the security 
field. The inherent idea is that the state’s most prominent interest is the security in a world 
dominated by power play. Weapons provides, not the only, but the most effective tool in 
providing security, as the ultimate mechanism to maintain security is, paradoxically, that of 
resort to war.  
                                                          
5 There are notable debates on the extent of which the Copenhagen school’s Securitization theory in itself is 
poststructuralist. This is understandable as poststructuralism itself is a highly contested label. However, the 
Copenhagen school’s theory departs from the view of poststructuralism presented earlier in this chapter by 





Security is central to the legitimacy of a state, as providing security is conceived as a primary 
reason for state’s being (Bellamy & McDonald 2004, 309–310). Sovereign power is a vital end 
that needs to be valued and preserved above any obligations to those outside the state (ibid.). 
The right of a state to non-intervention and non-interference is enshrined in the Charter of 
the United Nations, with only exception of the Security Council’s right, after identifying a 
threat to international peace and security, to authorize use of force against the common 
threat. (Bellamy 2010, 362.)  
 
Environment and security 
The whole notion of security as traditionally understood in terms of political and 
military threats to national sovereignty - must be expanded to include the 
growing impacts of environmental stress - locally, nationally, regionally, and 
globally. There are no military solutions to 'environmental insecurity'. (WCED 
1987, Chapter 1 III.3.86)  
From the viewpoint of international politics the report Our Common Future published in 1987 
by the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) led by 
Gro Harlem Brundtland, marked a significant articulation for the discourse of environmental 
security, and also more generally for discourses attempting to challenge the narrow security 
approach. The report states that the old patterns to maintain security and pursue 
development must be changed, and security must be sought through change as the “[threats] 
to environmental security can only be dealt with by joint management and multilateral 
procedures and mechanisms” (WCED 1987, chapter 11). The report addressed the harmful 
effect of current economic development to the environment, consequently challenging the 
inherent idea of national security where state’s best defense is to pursue economic growth to 
enable efficient military capacity.  
Since the publishing the report has worked as a reference in many United Nations’ 
conferences and multilateral agreements, highlighting that the most significant threats to 
international security come not from other states, but from global problems shared commonly 
by the international community (see e.g. Barnett 2010, 221, 224–225; Death 2010, 36–41). 
This acknowledgement is interconnected with the rise of an idea of ‘new wars’ where the 
threat arises not from the most powerful and strong states, like it has been seen in traditional 




ones. In new wars conflict do not necessarily spring from ideological and political reasons but 
can be triggered from issues such as degrading living conditions. (Beswick & Jackson 2015.) 
Many scholars saw this rise of the environmental security concept into the political debates 
initially as a good idea, as it was “meant to alarm traditional security analysts about the issues 
that ‘really’ matter” (deWilde 2001, 2 cited in Trombetta 2008, 586), but it also aroused 
concerns about bringing within a militarization of the environment (Käkönen 1994; see also 
Barnett 2010, 235), and being overwhelmingly a discourse only for northern countries 
(Trombetta 2009, 586).  
Within the environmental security discourse environment can be approached both as an 
object to be secured and as a source of threats. Jon Barnett argues that there are six major 
interoperations of environmental security that differ according to whether environment is set 
as the source of threats or object to be secured, and by the solutions proposed. From these 
six major interoperations, only ecological security and human security approaches to 
environmental security significantly departs from the premises of traditional security 
paradigm (Barnett 2010, 224–224). Ecological security draws on both Green philosophy and 
ecological theory to demand for a change in the reasons for action, so that they include 
concerns about the overall welfare of entire social-ecological system of the planet. Thus, 
building rather on planetary thinking than to national interest. (Barnett 2010, 224.)  When as 
human security – which I will come back later – sets the environment as one of the seven 
sections identified in the United Nations Development Program’s early definition of human 
security, where the environment is brought to be an inseparable part of human life and 
security. Opposite of these are the interoperations that more or less focus on the national 
security interests and possibilities of violent conflicts.   
In similar vein with Barnett, scholars such as Julia Trombetta (2008), Nicole Detraz and Michele 
Betsill (2009) have distinguished two generalized ways of linking security and environment 
within the environmental security literature, one drawing on the state and conflict centered 
discourse of security, and the other on human security and broad range of threats. Detraz and 
Betsill (2009, 305–306) have named these generalized ways as the environmental conflict and 
the environmental security discourse. According to the authors, the environmental conflict 
discourse draws largely on traditional military security discourse and focuses on the threats 




discourse on the other hand draws on human security by setting the well-being of individuals 
at the center. (Detraz & Betsill, 2009, 305–306.) The idea of environmental degradation and 
scarcities leading into conflict situations, prevailing within the environmental conflict 
discourse, is familiar from the so called neo-Malthusian storyline.   
Neo-Malthushusian storyline  
On late 18th century Thomas Malthus (1798/1998) notoriously assessed that there will be 
serious food shortages and large scale human misery on Earth due to growing population. 
According to Malthus’ assessment, world’s population would grow exponentially and food 
production only arithmetically, inevitably leading to shortage of food and recourses causing 
war, famine and diseases. The concern was reiterated by thinkers such as Fairfield Osborn 
(1948, 200– 201, cited in Matthew et. al. 2009, 11) who 150 years late wrote: ‘‘When will it be 
openly recognized that one of the principal causes of the aggressive attitudes of individual 
nations and of much of the present discord among groups of nations is traceable to 
diminishing productive lands and to increasing population pressures?’’. The idea was also 
present in the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth report published in 1970s (Meadows et. al. 
1972).  In more recent times the idea is famously reconstructed and studied by the so-called 
Toronto Group under the leadership of Thomas Homer-Dixon. The group has conducted a 
series of studies of scarcity-induced environmental conflicts where scarcity of renewable 
resources interacting with harsh social effects (such as population displacement or declining 
economy) creates social instability and leads to violent conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1994; Floyd 
2008, 55).  According to Homer-Dixon the causes of scarcities springs from decline in the 
quantity or quality of renewable resources, population growth and/or unequal resource 
access, interacting with failing states, international population displacements and rise of 
authoritarian regimes (Homer-Dixon 1994).   
Although the suggestion of straightforward connection between environmental degradation 
and violent conflict was made cautiously by Homer-Dixon, the thesis was very much 
popularized by Robert Kaplan’s article ‘The coming anarchy’ (1994) where he stated that “[i]t 
is time to understand the environment for what it is: the national-security issue of the early 
twenty-first century. The political and strategic impact of surging populations, spreading 
disease, deforestation and soil erosion, water depletion, air pollution, and, possibly, rising sea 




will prompt mass migrations and, in turn, incite group conflicts—will be the core foreign-policy 
challenge from which most others will ultimately emanate, arousing the public and uniting 
assorted interests left over from the Cold War.”  
The influence of the works of Homer-Dixon and the idea of large-scale environmental 
degradation, (exacerbated by rapid population growth) threatening to undermine political 
stability of states, regions, and through fragmenting or authoritarizing state structures, will 
undermine international security, has had notable significance especially in the United States 
(Hartmann 2009, 198–199; 2010, 236). The findings of Homer-Dixon and the Toronto Group 
have also been utilized by NATO researchers, according to whom the notion of environment 
in itself is unusable as an analytical category as the environment is rather a source of a 
complex series of syndromes that might cause conflict and not a straightforward causal factor 
(Dalby 2002, 97).   
In the very heart of the neo-Malthusian narrative is the concept of environmental refugee, 
who is identified by Norman Myers and Jennifer Kent (1995, 18-19) as, 
persons who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their traditional 
homelands because of environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, 
desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages and climate change, 
also natural disaster such as cyclones, storm surges and floods. In face of these 
environmental threats, people feel they have no alternative but to seek 
sustenance elsewhere, whether within their own countries or beyond and 
whether on a semi-permanent or permanent basis.  
According to the studies of Betsy Hartmann (2010) discourses linking climate change to 
security are very much influenced by the neo-Malthusian narrative of poor, starving 
populations being forced to overuse their scarce natural resources, leading to engagement in 
violent conflicts, and storming en masse to the borders of western world.  
Many scholars are critical toward the storyline, like it is stated by Idean Salehyan, “claims of 
environmental determinism leading seamlessly from climate change to open warfare are 
suspect. The overly structural logic linking climate change to armed conflict ignores human 
agency, ingenuity, the potential for technological innovation, and the vital role of political 
institutions in managing conflict (or failing to do so).” (Salehya 2008, 317.) The narrative is also 
contested by the so called resource abundance or “honey pot” thesis where it is an abundance 




thesis have argued that the resource abundance thesis ultimately falls down into the scarcity 
thesis as the value of abundant recourses springs from their scarcity on a global level. (Floyd 
2008, 54.) This has also led to criticism of the storyline too often confusing environment per 
se with that of the economic value (see e.g. Barnett 2001).   
 
Humans and security 
Today we cannot secure security for one state at the expense of the other. 
Security can only be universal, but security cannot only be political or military, 
it must be as well ecological, economical, and social. It must ensure the 
fulfilment of the aspirations of humanity as a whole. (WCED 1987.) 
A demand for redefining security in more global and comprehensive manner was the central 
to the Brundtland commission’s report, like the above citation of denotes. But it was not until 
in 1994 when the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) published Human 
Development Report that the notion of human security came into prominence (Matthew et. 
all 2009, 8–9) and articulated a demand that really challenged the state and conflict centered 
discourse of security.  In the Human Development report security is defined as “safety from 
the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression [...] protection from sudden and 
hurtful disruptions in the pattern of our daily lives-whether in our homes, in our jobs, in our 
communities or in our environment.” (UNDP 1994, 3). In-line with the Brundtland 
Commission’s report, the UNDP’s report demands defining development and security in terms 
of sustainability and universality, and prioritizing individuals over the states, as it is elaborated 
below:  
For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict 
between states. For too long, security has been equated with the threats to a 
country's borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their 
security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries 
about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, 
income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime – 
these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world. (UNDP 
1994, 3.) 
It is not the threat of nuclear holocaust that is in the heart of human security approach, but 
“the threat of global poverty travelling across international borders in the form of drugs, 
HIV/AIDS, climate change, illegal migration and terrorism” (UNDP 1994, 24). And for that 




security to a much greater stress on people's security” and “[f]rom security through 
armaments to security through sustainable human development. Security is not just about 
survival, but “safety from the constant threats of hunger, disease, crime and repression” and 
protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions (UNDP 1994, 3). Security means protecting 
the livelihoods and dignity of people as well as strengthening their own capacities to act as 
subjects of security (the United Nations Human Security Unit, 2009, 5).  
Many scholars have argued that if human security is to have any analytical relevance, it should 
focus on the narrow ‘freedom from fear’ definition (see e.g. Thomas & Tow 2002; Kerr 2010, 
124–127; Mack 2004). The concern should be on the threats of violence individuals and 
societies face.  The international Commission on Human Security, among many other 
institutions and scholars, have gone to the opposite direction arguing that human security 
needs to be seen as protecting the fundamental freedoms and vital core of human lives, and 
not to be restricted to physical violence (The United Nations Human Security Unit 2009, 5.) 
This broad definition also emphasizes the heterogeneity of ‘vital core’ that is valued in 
societies, and gives importance to that of what is seen as the paramount concerns (Matthew 
et. all 2009, 9). Neither the nature of a threat nor the vital core is seen as universal and fixed, 
but requires context-specific investigation.  The approach acknowledges that “insecurities 
vary considerably across different settings and as such advances contextualized solutions that 
are responsive to the particular situations they seek to address” (the United Nations Human 
Security Unit 2009, 7). It also builds on idea of interconnectedness of threats which causes 
domino effects and allow the uncontrollable spreading of threats into other areas that 
demand preventative and comprehensive dealing with security. It is through “development of 
an interconnected network of diverse stakeholders” — which is comprised of multiple actors 
from private and public sectors at the local, national, regional and international levels — that 
sufficient knowledge and expertise can be achieved for implementing policies and 
programmes of human security. (The United Nations Human Security Unit 2009, 14, 22–24.) 
Storyline of development security 
Especially since the end of the Cold War development has been increasingly interlinked with 
security concerns (see Chandler 2007; Duffield 2007).  Governments and international 
institutions have increasingly acknowledged development as a prerequisite for development 




decolonialization, guerrilla movements and Western governmental rationality of privatization 
shifted security rationality based upon the accumulation of arms and political alliances, to 
governing the lives of poverty ridden societies that were seen potentially dangerous.  Poverty, 
unchecked population growth, and environmental collapse do to overuse, with insufficient or 
‘predatory’ institutions were seen to drive societies into violence and chaos (ibid., 311).   
Fragile, poverty ridden states are thus conceived as more prone to instability and conflict, and 
lack capacity to tackle networks of terrorism and organized crime, which has risen liberal 
state-building and developmental assistance as crucial security strategies of the West 
(Beswick & Jackson 2015,10–11, 14, 21; see also Duffield 2001). Security is conceived largely 
as borderless and interconnected with new ways, forming an integrated network of global 
security (Sörensen 2010, 60–61). Rather than to create a sovereign unit, stated-building aims 
at shaping ‘human-security states’ (ibid.). In more recently, the focus of development has 
shifted more into establishment of efficient natural resource management mechanisms and 
‘Climate-Smart Development’, which addresses the necessity of environmental sustainability 
(Duffield & Evans 2011, 96–100).  
The idea of good governance is crucial part of the development narrative (Pomerantz 2011, 
163–164). The idea of good governance highlights the meaning of rule of law, accountability, 
participation, human rights, regulatory authority and institution building in pursuing effective 
development and desired outcomes (ibid.). Good governance is seen to be enhancing both 
human security and sustainable development and promoting active citizen participation in 
decision making (Nsiah-Gyabaah 2007, 248). By sharing the same objectives, human security 
and human development are seen as mutually reinforcing, and interdependent (Nsiah-
Gyabaah 2007, 251, 253).   
 
Securitization 
One widely renowned attempt to explain the processes of which the security practices has 
been extended to different sectors, such as the environment and economy, is the 
securitization theory of Copenhagen school. Building on the speech act theory developed by 
John Searle and John Austin, the authors of Copenhagen School constructed security as a 




designated referent object” and gains acceptance by relevant audience, something becomes 
a security issue (Buzan et. al. 1998, 21). The threat and the object are thus discursively formed 
through this speech act. The speech act can be performed by any individual or group that has 
certain amount of authority and legitimacy, and through acceptance constructs a sense of 
urgency and legitimizes a deployment of a range of exceptional measures that would not be 
accepted for a problem in the terrain of ‘regular’ politics (Wæver 1995, 55). Securitization is 
thus, “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the 
issue either as special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et. al. 1998, 23). In other 
words, securitization is an extreme version of politicization that occurs if the referent object 
and its claim of survival gets accepted by a relevant audience. However, not all things can be 
equally securitized, a lack of authority of an individual or the high level of abstraction of 
systemic units such as humanity or international community, often prevents them to be 
successfully securitized (ibid. 36–37). Neither will all successful securitizations lead to the 
adaptation of exceptional measures. According to the authors, successful securitizing move 
does not require adaptation but only approval of exceptional measures (Buzan et. al. 1998, 
25). This, of course, raises questions of the causes which then leads or does not lead to the 
adaptation of the exceptional measures. 
From the viewpoint of this thesis’ poststructuralist engagement there are few profound 
shortcomings in the theory. One of the shortcomings is the theory’s focus on securitization as 
a particular moment rather than as a continuous inter-subjective process forced by multiply 
actors is also clashes with poststructuralist understanding of discourse (Balzacq 2011a). Other 
troubling shortcoming is the understanding of security as fixed to survival and exceptional 
measure (see Buzan et. al. 1998, 21). These deficiencies have been acknowledged by 
poststructuralist scholars such as Thierry Balzacq and Delf Rothe, who have been further 
developing the theory of securitization from the viewpoint of poststructuralism.  
It is argued by Balzacq (2011a, 8) that in order to overcome the deficiencies, “securitization 
studies must generate theoretical assumptions about intersubjectivity, context, and 
practices”. According to Balzacq securitization needs to be brought from emphasizing the 
illocutionary act underpinning the emergence of security problems to concentrate more on 
the sociologically focused perlocutionary act of language. This would free the framework of 




(Balzacq & Guzzini 2015, 99; Balzacq 2005, 172–173). Balzacq’s critics and analytical approach 
builds strongly on one hand to Pierre Bourdieu’s theorizations of habitus, and on the other 
Michel Foucault’s notion of dispositif. Habitus refers to a set of dispositions that informs the 
perceptions and behaviors of agents’ performatives in specific socio-cultural context, and 
helps to understand the ability of their participation in the process of securitization. When as 
the concept of dispositif, which Foucault established in order to extend his notion of discourse 
to include not just linguistic practices but the institutions, administrative measures, 
knowledge structures and other social practices, helps to overcome the Copenhagen School’s 
fixation on language. (Balzacq 2011a, 2–3; Rothe 2016, 36–37.) Balzacq (2001, 3) argues that 
securitization needs to be understood as “an articulated assemblage of practices whereby 
heuristic artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, 
emotions, etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an 
audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts, and 
intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the 
securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such 
an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be 
undertaken immediately to block its development”.  
This approach brings us closer to the logic of social presented in the discourse theory of Laclau 
and Mouffe. Rather than being dependent on a specific moment, the securitization is seen as 
a continuous discursive formation. It also acknowledges the importance of “mundane” 
practices of security actors and experts in the securitizing move. Like it is argued by Didier Bigo 
(2002) in his study of securitization of the European Unions’ immigration policy, it is precisely 
in the routinized and mundane practices of surveillance and control of security professionals 
where the securitization takes place. According to Bigo, it is through the habitus of security 
professionals that immigrants are securitized to be conceived as a risk (ibid.)  
Aling with Balzacq, Delf Rothe (2016, 53, 56) argues that there is a major contradiction in 
Copenhagen School’s theory as it by building on the speech act theory engages with an 
ontology revolving around the securitizing actor and the securitizing move that is incompatible 
with the notion of discourse that it is also engaged to. Where Rothe departs from the view of 
Balzacq is in defining discourse as an ontological category, as it is understood in the discourse 




not reducible to the intentions of a speaker – as there is not such a thing as pre-discursive 
consciousness– but is to be studied through the context of which subject positions are 
maintained and transformed. Rothe argues that securitization can only be understood in 
terms of ‘citational chains of performativity’, where performativity does not refer to a singular 
act but to the patterns of repeated articulations — which to recall, are not reducible to the 
sematic aspects of language but includes also the pragmatic aspects of action — that forms 
the discourse and the effects it names (Rothe 2016, 52–55). As he illustrates:  
No actor in the world, however powerful she might be, could constitute climate 
change as a security issue through her articulation. Only through repetition and 
rearticulation of arguments that link climate change to security could a genuine 
climate security discourse develop. And the repeated articulation of statements 
such as ‘climate change represents a global security issue’ at the same time 
affects the context of articulations itself – for example the dominant security 
concepts could slowly change, e.g. from a national to a global reference point of 
security. (Rothe 2016, 56.) 
Rothe criticizes the Copenhagen school for restricting the ‘grammar of security’ i.e. the 
determination towards existential threats and exceptional measures, from the area of radical 
contingency of meaning.  In purely poststructuralist view, there is always a possibility of a 
change also within the security discourse itself. (Ibid., 83–84.) He argues against Copenhagen 
School’s tendency to draw security out of the sphere of politics and take it as “anti-politics” or 
as “the politically constituted limit to politics” (Wæver 2011, 478, cited in Rothe 2016, 76). 
Align with Balzacq and other authors engaging with sociological version of securitization6, 
Rothe acknowledges the political relevance of mundane security practices, but sees it as 
theoretical biased to be approaching these mundane practices – that are most often 
approached as technique of governance through risk – as distinct from the ‘exceptional’ 
security practices. Rather he suggests that “security and risk are actually two sides of the same 
governmental coin” (Rothe 2016, 87–89). According to Rothe, 
[to] assume the existence of two independent logics of securitization and 
riskification is problematic as it blurs how security and risk rationales actually 
become fused in complex processes of securitization; this is not a process of a 
unidirectional transfer from exceptional security to mundane risk – from 
                                                          
6 The sociological version of securitization is often referred as Paris School of Security Studies. They strongly 
build on the heritage of Foucault, and focus mainly on security professionals, the governmental rationality of 




geopolitics to biopolitics – but rather one of mutual imbrication of both 
discourses. (Rothe 2016, 88–89.) 
He draws his argument on the theory of hegemony, while suggesting that the technologies of 
risk and security can be read as an expressions of the hegemonic struggle. Following the logic 
of difference, the practices of risk management are separating and translating social demands 
into differential risks that need to be addressed separately. The antagonisms of these 
demands are decentralized into the periphery of the social and the society is constituted as a 
space of differences that offers only differential subject positions, and as a result, preventing 
the establishment of new political projects. In contrast to this, the geopolitical logic of security 
constitutes the logic of equivalence and demarcates the boundaries between the “likeness” 
of individuals and the external enemy, creating a homogeneous space with a common political 
identity. (Rothe 2016, 89–90.)  
For Rothe securitization to this process of discursive struggle where discourse coalitions tend 
to share and (re)articulate storylines of faced problem as a security problem, and establish the 
storylines and demands as a common sense (ibid., 95–97).  There are two criteria for the 
storyline to become hegemonic and thus to appear as a common sense. The first criterion is 
discourse structuration, which gets higher as more discursive agents have to draw upon the 
storylines in order to make a relevant contribution to the discourse. In climate change 
discourse it could be said, for example, that the Anthropocene has a pretty high discourse 
structuration, as it is hard to deny the human influence to the world’s climate if to make a 
reasonable contribution. (Rothe 2016, 63.) Second criterions is discourse institutionalization 
where, after accepted, the storylines “become inscribed into societal and political practices, 
routines and organizations and materialize in important societal and governmental 
institutions” (ibid). The policy impact of securitization project is dependent on the degree of 
which it manages to fulfill these two criteria. By articulating alternative storylines securitizing 
discourse can thus bring changes to the very definition of the discourse of security itself. And 
that it exactly what Rothe suggests has happened in the climate security discourse with the 
concept of risk and resilience that have been challenging the storyline of a military security 
(Rothe 2016, 102–103).   
The logic of securitization suggested by Rothe, is convenient especially for its ability to 




the gap between the Copenhagen School’s aim to reveal the realities constituted by 
securitizing moves and Balzacq’s endeavor to reveal the complex social mechanisms behind 
securitizing processes. It enables to analyze not just the discourses, but also the political 




As an act of articulation the debates on the issue of climate change held in the United Nations 
Security Council represent a challenge to the traditional definition of security. The United 
Nations Security Council was established under the hegemony of a discourse of security as 
securing the state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity against external military threats. The 
existence and everyday functioning of the UNSC is part of the ongoing practice of defending 
the discourse of traditional security as the UNSC itself manifests the institutionalized form of 
that understanding. Climate change as a disruptive or dislocating discursive event challenges 
the meaning of security as it is conceptualized in traditional security discourse. Climate change 
is constructed as a threat that will increase the possibility of conflicts by working as a root 
cause and multiplier. It is also a grave threat by itself and it should be urgently recognized that 
its “consequences can be far greater than any battle fought” (S/PV.6587 (Res.), 36).  
While the traditional security discourse principally conceives the threat in terms of external 
military attack, the threat of climate change is presented both as engendering internally within 
societies and as an external threat. What constitutes the threat of climate change to the 
international security, is not the change in climatic conditions per se, but poor governing 
structures, lacking or unsustainable development and failing adaptation measures. Climate 
change is seen causing changes in economic structures by undermining the capacity to 
produce food, destroying habitable areas and creating scarcities of natural resources, such as 
water, that without convenient adaptation measures threatens the wellbeing and existence 
of individuals, societies and even states.  
Climate change poses a threat that overwhelms the defensive capacity of an individual state 
without engagement to joint efforts with other security actors. Climate change is not 




some of its implications are fightable with weapons. This is making the threat posed by climate 
change even more immense, and heightening its significance in the frames of international 
security. The accelerating, global and interconnected nature of climate change calls forth 
preventive, holistic and multilevel orientation towards security, which produces challenges to 
the international community and existing security structures that have not been established 
to face the new security realities.  
According to Rothe (2016, 259), the emergence of climate change as a security problem is 
both the outcome and cause of mutual imbrications and interplay of specialized discourses 
that has resulted “both a transfer of security rationales to the climate change discourse and 
at the same time a spillover of concepts from climate change discourse into the security field”. 
What this means in the process of securitizing climate change is that the securitization is not 
to be conceived only as an outcome of articulations of existential threats nor of acceptance of 
exceptional measures, but is highly induced by adaptation of ‘risk grammatic’ that highlights 
uncertainty and calculation of potential future harms, which do not take the form of ‘state of 
exception’ (Rothe 2016; see also Corry 2012).  This means that rather than the disappearance 
of geopolitical security logic, what is happening is the (re)articulation of antagonisms and the 
construction of a collective identities whose wellbeing are to be secured.    
Following the definition of articulation presented by Laclau and Mouffe (2001, 91), where 
articulation is understood as “any practice establishing a relation among elements in such that 
their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice”, I have conducted three 
attempts of (re)articulation establishing new a understanding of security. The dislocatory 
effects of climate change for hegemonic structures result in a proliferation of floating 
signifiers, which is followed by a hegemonic struggle over the integration of those floating 
signifiers into competing discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 28–29; Methmann 2010, 353–
354). The floating character represents the overflowing of meaning, as the signifier is 
articulated differently within different discourses (Laclau 2014, 20). The (re)articulations 
identified in this thesis, are based on discourses of security presented in previous chapter. In 
each discourse the meaning of security is taking a different form. The third (re)articulation 
presents an exaptation in a way that it does not fit into any prevailing discourses of security, 




These different articulations are united through chain of equivalence and common nodal 
points that harmonize the differential features (Laclau 2014, 19–20). For example, human 
security is brought to the equivalential relation with international security by introducing 
human insecurity as a source of interstate conflicts. The more the equivalential chain is 
extended, the more the particularistic characters of the elements in the chain are dropped 
out (ibid.).  That is why climate security discourse is able to absorb even contradictory 
concepts. Climate security in the analysis seems to take the form of an empty signifier by 
presenting that which is absent.     
I will start by introducing the way in which climate change is in widely conceived within the 
debates. I will then go through the (re)articulations, which each is constructing different 
understanding of security. I will continue to discuss how climate security discourse is produced 
through chain of equivalence and emptying of the sign ‘climate security’. In each part I am at 
introducing the ways in which the traditional discourse of security is challenged by the climate 
security. Since this offensive hegemonic project does not occur without defense of the existing 
form of hegemony, I will introduce how many of the demands of climate security are merged 
into the old discursive structures. At the meeting over impact of climate change, a presidential 
statement was agreed on. I will discuss it separately as it can be seen that the statement acts 
as an articulation on its own. But the statement also demonstrates to what extent the climate 
security discourse has already affected to the understanding of security prevailing within the 
UNSC.    
 
What makes Climate Change threatening: The narrative of dangerous climate change 
I started my analysis by investigating what makes climate change threatening. What the 
arguments favoring securitization of climate change are, and why climate change is linked to 
international security. Through this analysis, I was able to find certain characteristics linked to 
climate change that are producing an imagery of climate change as dangerous climate change. 
Arguments calling forth immediate and effective action and recognition of climate change as 
a security issue draws on these feature, but at the same time these very same features are 
also used as justifications of why climate change is not nor should be seen as a security issue. 
I will then present the (re)articulations of security that each establishes the relation of security 




climate security is established through chain of equivalence to form a commonly shared 
demand that aims at contesting the hegemonic discourse of security that fails to acknowledge 
climate change as a security issue. The understanding of climate change as a dangerous other, 
is the outcome of this production of climate security discourse. I will later on show in more 
detail how these characteristics presented below are central to the construction of climate 
change as the antagonistic enemy of humanity that produces humanity as a homogenous 
social space. 
First, climate change is characterized as being exacerbating in dangerous manner with 
possibility to be hindered, but not turned back or eliminated. If action is not taken to hinder 
the climate change, it will inevitably lead to abrupt and catastrophic consequences. In other 
words, the threats posed by climate change, irrespective of the referent object articulated, 
are something that cannot be fully eradicated but mitigated and adapted through collective 
action. Secondly, climate change is seen as highly complex and interconnected, which makes 
it very challenging to be scientifically calculated and predicted. Climate change itself is “a fact”, 
but it is uncertain “how fast and in how many different domains it will manifest itself” 
(S/PV.6587, 4). It is a cross-cutting issue that includes unavoidable uncertainties demanding 
urgent and globally administrated action on multiple fronts and with varying ways. These 
uncertainties brings forth a picture of a looming catastrophe that worsens by far as 
disagreements prevail within joint commitments and common procedures, rendering 
international community to be “at risk of an abrupt climate change” (S/PV.6587 (Res.), 22). 
Conventional weaponry is insufficient in facing complex and interconnected climate change. 
At best it can bring security in climate related conflict situations but has only negative effects 
on the root causes of climate change itself.  
And thirdly, “[c]limate change is truly a global problem” (S/PV.5663 (Res.), 24, emphasis 
added), in the sense it has an effect on everyone in a one way or the other. It is acknowledged 
that developed countries bear the main responsibility of the onset of current climate change, 
whereas the most severe effects fall on those who are the least responsible for it, such as 
small island developing states. Nevertheless, the populations and states that are better 
equipped to face the changes in climatic conditions “will be forced to cope with agony of 
human displacement of determined refugees and the consequences of the human misery of 




interconnected world, no man is an island” (S/PV.7499, 76). Climate change is a “global threat 
that requires global solutions that are just, equitable and balanced” (S/PV.6587 (Res.), 12).  
The three (re)articulations. 
As it was discussed earlier, articulation refers to any practice that shapes the structure of 
discourse modifying the identity of its elements. I have distinguished three different 
articulations that aim at partial fixation of a meaning of security. The discourses of security 
introduced in previous chapter are used in framing the articulations found from the research 
material. These articulations do merge in certain points, but differ in articulation of subject 
positions. What is notable, is that even as the participators in the UNSC are representatives of 
states, state is not conceived as the only subject of security. Especially the private sector actors 
are seen as crucial partners in security governance. There are also calls for a universal body 
that could restitute state as the provider of security against climate change, which overruns 
the capabilities of many states. What needs to be secured is not only survival, but 
environmental conditions and economic and social structures that provide decent living 
conditions.    
Articulation 1. Climate change as a root cause of conflict  
One of the articulations that modifies the meaning of security establishes the relationship 
between climate change and security by designating climate change as a root cause of 
conflicts. Climate change is defined as the mother of all other major environmental problems 
such as degradation, scarcities of natural resources and loss of habitable land, which in turn 
are provoking conflicts and resource wars. This articulation is highly influenced by the neo-
Malthusian narrative where environmental degradation and depletion of renewable 
resources together with social conditions unable to buffer these changes are seen as the 
triggers of conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1994). Environmental changes engender stress to societies, 
which without requisite adaptation measures and preventive action, will cause mass 
migration and violent behavior. War and violent conflicts are seen as likely ways to secure the 
possession of scarce resources and livelihoods. As the potentiality of a conflict depends not 
only on environmental changes but also on the capacities of societies to adapt to these 
changes, poorer and less developed societies and fragile and weak states are seen as the most 
potential breeding grounds for conflicts. These societies and states are seen more vulnerable 




conflict perspective, it is these hot spots that are forming the danger as the “[a]dditional 
pressures caused by climate change increase the risk of having fragile States lapse or relapse 
into civil war and chaos” (S/PV.5663, 5), from where it can spread across the globe through 
“migration on an unprecedented scale” (S/PV.5663, 18). 
Whereas for the vulnerable states and societies the threat of climate change arises from the 
dangerous climate change that is undermining the states capacities and institutions, and 
increasing internal instability potentially leading to conflicts, for international security, and 
especially for the national security of Western states, it is these vulnerable who are forming 
the dangerous enemies that need to be secured against. As the securitization logic takes it, 
this implies an adaptation of security measures against the threats. But instead of seeing 
military intervention as the most optimal way to address the threat, the exacerbating, 
pervasive and thoroughly unstoppable nature of climate changes shifts the emphasis on 
preemption and to the root causes of conflict defining capacity-building as the most effective 
way of defense.  If climate change as the root cause of conflicts is not addressed, the 
international community “will be helpless to prevent conflict, and will have to spend much 
money on peacekeeping operations that do not address its root causes” (S/PV.6587 (Res.), 
34), and which will increase in number and magnitude as “the looming climate catastrophe” 
is missed to be softened (S/PV.5663 (Res.), 2).  
War and conflict are more likely survival techniques for those societies that are the least 
equipped to respond and adapt to the negative effects of climate change, and through 
“destabilizing population movements” (S/PV.6587, 24) the conflicts can potentially spread 
across the globe. Environmental scarcities plays central and growing role as  triggers of 
conflict, but it is the increasing movement of people that transfers the threat to the 
international level, this is apparent in following kind of statements: “[C]limate change, with its 
potentially tragic consequences for security — such as the displacement and transfer of 
populations, the former of which we have already witnessed — will become an increasingly 
critical factor in the underlying causes of conflict as the climate continues to change at an 
ever-faster pace” (S/PV.6587 (Res.), 4). The aggravating nature of climate change is 
accelerating and transforming the patterns of migration with blurring “the traditional 
distinction between migrants, who cross borders in search of a better life, and refugees, who 




According to Betsy Hartmann the concept of environmental refugee is today seamlessly 
morphed into a climate refugee with continuation to draw on the neo-Malthusian storyline 
(Hartmann 2013, 159). Climate refugee symbolizes the threat of spreading social unrest, 
instability and increased potential of conflict. The concept of a climate refugee, however, 
departs from the concept of environmental refugee presented by Myers and Kent (1995, 18–
19) by emphasizing climate change not as one of the factors forcing people to seek secure 
conditions outside of their traditional homelands but as the fundamental reason. Climate 
refugee thus represents both, the danger of outbreak of conflicts people seek secure from, 
and the danger of the conflict moving to the borders of developed nations. Betsy Hartmann 
argues (2013, 154, 163–164.) that the narratives around climate related conflict and climate 
refugee are closely connected with worst-case scenarios and counterinsurgency strategies of 
Western defense interest, further blurring the line between humanitarian aid and military 
intervention.  
The underlying logic of neo-Malthusianism locates the resource related conflicts primarily to 
the so called developing states, where if not rightly governed, they can spread to all over the 
world, forming a threat to the identity of developed states as a coherent and stabile. But this 
logic also stresses the need for capacity and institution building as a security strategy in order 
to prevent the outbreaks of conflicts that are in significant extent arising from environmental 
sources, needing efficient management and practices of adaptation. The lacking or insufficient 
governing structures are one of the main reasons causing vulnerability to climate change, 
together with the exposure of the physical impacts.  It is the lack or fragility of state institutions 
that account for failed adaptation and provides conflict prone conditions.  
Climate change will increase the pressure on the states coping capacities on multiply fronts. 
By increasing poverty and environmental stress, climate change can push fragile and poor 
states into a vicious cycle, where the causes of vulnerability are brought under intensified 
pressure due to the climate change. The conflict is more likely to occur between non-state 
actors and the state or between actors none of whom have any links to the militaries of states. 
Conflicts are outcomes of complex and interconnected chains of deteriorating environmental 
and social conditions that overrun the institutional capacities of states to provide safety from 
them.  Put differently, what always precedes the climate conflicts is social instability, which is 




Those better equipped and less vulnerable are at the heart in advancing and strengthening of 
the governmental structures of fragile and developing states. This offers subject positions that 
I have named as ‘a preventer’ and ‘a vulnerable’ state.  Preventer aims at building and 
strengthening the means of vulnerable societies and states to cope with changes and stress 
without engaging into violent behavior or provoking widespread political unrest. “A key issue 
is the identification of cases of successful adaptation in the developing world, where the 
greatest risk and physical vulnerability persists” (S/PV.6587 (Res.), 30). At the heart of this 
subject position is the aim to prevent “the poorest and the most affected by climate change 
[from migrating] towards the most developed areas, with the resulting tensions and risks” 
(S/PV.5663 (Res.), 20). As a leaders of international community it is the responsibility of 
preventers to “mobilize the political will necessary to address vulnerability in countries liable 
to suffer from instability, through promoting knowledge, facilitating the transfer of 
technology, putting in place adaptation and impact mitigation mechanisms and providing 
sufficient resources to rise to the challenges of climate change” S/PV.5663, 10). The vulnerable 
state is seen to suffer more badly from the effects of climate change and in need of the help 
of the preventer. Those state representatives that identify themselves to the subject position 
of the vulnerable, are often identifying themselves also as a developing state. In the heart of 
the identity of the developing state, is a right for development. Right for development is often 
characterized as a linear improvement that is necessary for enhancing security. The lack of 
development is understood to lead to chaos and disorder that can only be overcame through 
achieving —mainly economic—development.  
The argument challenges the logic of security prevailing within the traditional security 
discourse by shifting the focus from security measures based on absolute sovereignty and 
reaction to prevention and intervention. The best way to achieve security for the future is no 
more the menace or use of force as the accelerating climate change will increasingly 
complicate and multiple conflicts. What is demanded is a global approach and security politics 
based on cooperation and joint efforts, maintaining within the traditional nation based 
security logic is seen to lead to conformational politics. As it is stated by one representative in 
the Council that, ”[o]ur response will either unite us in cooperative action or divide us and 
lead us into chaos, tension and potential conflict” (S/PV.6587, 6). It is thus claimed in the 




joint efforts and global governance. Even as it is the state that forms the referent object, the 
national security can only be provided through cooperation as “[n]o region on the surface of 
the globe is immune” (S/PV.6587, 16) to the interconnected and global threat of climate 
change. Thus it is by jointly strengthening the security of vulnerable states that also the 
security of less vulnerable states is strengthened.  
The precautionary aim central in the articulation emphasizes the threat of climate change as 
a future threat that must be addressed with risk management measures. Drawing on 
calculations on probabilities and vulnerabilities, certain places or societies can be seen as a 
risk-groups that are in need of precautionary measures. It is only if these risk management 
practices are failed more exceptional security measures are called forth. Certain on-going 
conflicts such as Darfur, are presented as warning illustrations of situations where climate 
change as a root cause of conflict has demanded exceptional measures in the behavior of the 
international community (S/PV.5663 (Res.), 14; S/PV.6587, 7; S/PV.6587 (Res.), 34).  
Olaf Corry (2012, 247) has suggested that in ‘riskification’ “[t]he referent-object itself rather 
than an enemy becomes the primary target of risk programmes – something to be changed 
and governed rather than something to be defended as such”, and the concept of defense 
ceases to have operational sense. The riskification leads to the adaptation of risk management 
programmes that are presented as opposite to exceptional mode of security of securitization 
logic (ibid. 247–248; Rothe 2016, 87). In the articulation of climate change as a root cause of 
conflict the governance through risk is a central part of defense strategy, as the threat is not 
simply shifted to the periphery of social by depersonalizing and differentiating the danger, but 
also articulated with binary framing, where the boundary drawn between the adaptive and 
maladaptive societies, poor and rich, responsible and irresponsible or the preventers and the 
ones becoming dangerous.    
Articulation 2. Climate change as threat multiplier 
The articulation I have named as climate change as threat multiplier acknowledges climate 
changes as a driver of conflicts but sets conflict neither as the only nor the biggest threat 
climate change is causing. The stressors such as natural hazards, changing environmental 
conditions, deflating economic structures and livelihoods, sea-level rise and shifting demands 
on energy supplies that result from climate change, are themselves great threats to the lives 




articulation is established through climate change’s negative implications on human security. 
It is the tremendous human suffering and loss of life caused by environmental changes what 
make climate change a security issue.  Climate change increasingly exacerbates existing 
negative trends, tensions and instabilities, and gives rise to new highly complex and integrated 
insecurities that are more developmental and humanitarian than military by their nature.  
Aligned with the broader human security approach, the articulation insist an open character 
towards constituting the vital core of people’s lives and the nature of threat. What the 
fulfillment of this open character requires in order to become a global problem is, that the 
threat is commonly shared by a great number of individuals, or it is violating human rights, 
which are acknowledged as universal rights.  Respect of human rights are presented to be at 
the heart of human security, and are thus seen also as a prerequisite for peace and security. 
The articulation states that international and global security must be rooted on human 
security as there are no clear boundaries “between the agendas of health, human rights, 
environmental protection, economic development and maintaining international peace and 
security”(S/PV.7499, 70). “Ultimately, security must be rooted in opportunity, freedom and 
hope” (S/PV.6668, 3).   
It is also stressed that “[p]eace, security, stability and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including the right to development, as well as respect for cultural 
diversity, are essential for achieving sustainable development and ensuring that sustainable 
development benefits all” (S/PV.7499, 84). Sustainable development is not linked to economic 
growth only, but to development of individuals’ capacity to cope in increasingly insecure and 
unstable world. Sustainable development works as an antidote against the vulnerabilities 
associated with the threat of climate change. Vulnerability to climate change arises from the 
exposure, sensitivity and capacity to respond to it, as well as from their unequal distribution. 
Equality is a crucial part of security, as in the frames of climate change “peace and security 
becomes consolidated when we have inclusive development, namely, a development with 
healthy ecosystems, a development that promotes equality and respect for human rights” 
(S/PV.7499, 71). Climate change both fosters and creates inequalities, together with 
increasing vulnerabilities that arises from other sources. The UNSC collectively with multiple 
other stakeholders, like non-governmental organizations (NGOs), governments and 




and coordinated. This articulation argues that as the UNSC is entrusted with the maintenance 
of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter, it has a legitimate 
aspiration to ensure human security everywhere, as it is stressed that there can be no global 
security without human security.  
An individual is a part of a common humanity which is threatened by complex and devastating 
climate change, rather than a citizen of any particular state. The winners and losers of climate 
change emphasized by the inequality perspective are humans and not states. Many individuals 
are suffering from the causes of climate change on the basis of their everyday lives, without 
having contributed to it equally. Climate change “impacts primarily the most vulnerable, who 
are the least responsible for its causes but have to cope with its effects on a daily basis” 
(S/PV.6587 (Res.), 4). In the longer run, not only states can fail or disappear from the map, but 
many individual suffers by losing livelihoods, nationhood and even culture. They are the 
victims of climate change that are most often seen as innocent of the devastating situation 
they are faced with, and in need of a guidance and empowerment. The representatives of 
these vulnerable states are demanding those responsible of the outset of climate change to 
provide their societies with financial and technological aid to tackle the insecurities the people 
are increasingly facing. Climate change creates humanitarian emergencies that are global 
security threats which the global community must prepare for, manage and prevent.  As a 
universal right human security should be provided to every human on behalf of the global 
community and especially by its leaders. This should be done by establishing new structures 
and rules to ensure that proper action is taken to deteriorate the threat of climate change.  
People and societies are set as referent objects to be secured from the complex and integrated 
threat of climate change. These vulnerabilities do not follow borders, but are outcomes of 
different characters shared by individuals and groups. Groups such as women, migrants and 
poor, are seen as especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change. The implications of 
climate change on human security are multiple and connected in a way that every insecurity 
potentially feeds one another. Insecurities are interlinked into a ripple effect where every 
threat is fed by the other, and potentially spreading globally with no respect to the national 
boundaries. For example a loss of agricultural land is linked with increasing poverty and food 
insecurity, which in turn, are seen to provoke crime and extremism that create more 




threatening outcomes of climate change, which unlike in previous articulation, is approached 
from the viewpoint of the person forced to migrate. It is argued that no one should be 
obligated to leave their homes due to environmental threats nor to face the hostile 
uncertainty that displacement is causing. The best way in providing global human security, 
and thus international security, is through sustainable development. 
As a global threat climate change demands global action, where everyone is to be provided 
with the capacity to adapt to environmental changes and to secure themselves against the 
multiple stressors caused by climate change. The articulation spreads the threat of climate 
change into multiple different and context dependent threats. It is demanded in the 
articulation that as the physical and social impacts of climate change are causing more deaths 
and large scale suffering than any ongoing war or conflict, it should be defined as a high 
priority threat and addressed with a great urgency. But as the articulation differentiates the 
threat by insisting on the open character, it articulates climate change as such many-faced 
threat that it limbs with articulating the common good in effective manner. Put differently, 
the insecurities resulting from climate change vary highly depending on the contexts, rising 
from differential needs in providing the well-being and securing the lives of the people. The 
subject position of the most vulnerable, offered within the articulation, is represented being 
the ones most urgently in need of a capacity-building as they are less developed and least able 
to adapt and protect themselves from increasing insecurities. These are often the citizens of 
vulnerable states. But as human security is the prerequisite of a global security, the 
articulation calls forth humanity as a collective subjectivity. It is stated that fight against 
climate change “is not a struggle against anyone; rather, it is a fight against time and for the 
benefit of humanity”(S/PV.5663 (Res.), 32).  
The proliferation of points of antagonism, which makes it more difficult to articulate a political 
project and defining the common good, is entwined through construction of antagonistic 
frontier between common humanity and climate change (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 117–120). In 
other words, in the articulation, the multiple and varying sources of vulnerabilities is tied 
together through their common underminer of climate change. However, the articulation 
leaves both the meaning of security and its tools to relatively abstract and open as, “a one-
size-fits-all approach cannot provide workable and sustainable solutions” (S/PV.7499, 8) in a 




Articulation 3. Climate change as an existential threat 
But Tuvalu is not alone in facing the threat of climate change. Many millions of 
people will suffer the effects. The world has moved from a global threat called 
the cold war to what should now be considered the “warming war”. Our conflict 
is not being fought with guns and missiles but with weapons from everyday life 
— chimney stacks and exhaust pipes. (S/PV.5663 (Res.), 8.)  
Especially small island developing States (SIDS) that identifies often with the subject position 
of vulnerable and of a victim, articulates climate change as an existential threat. Climate 
change is not just a multiplier or root cause of threats, but an existential threat. It is not the 
threat of conflict or deteriorating human well-being, but a threat of pure existence. Climate 
change threatens the existence of many cultures, states, societies and individuals. These 
victim define themselves as being “confronted with a chemical war of immense proportions” 
(S/PV.5663 (Res.), 8) that along with violating the fundamental rights of many people by 
depriving their traditional living areas, nationhood, identity and possibilities to maintain their 
own ways of living, is rendering their whole existence at risk. 
The articulation of climate change as an existential threat departs from the two previous 
articulations in its emphasis on climate change as the solely most concerning security threat 
international security is facing. Climate change does not form a threat only by exacerbating 
already existing threats or by triggering conflict, but is an independent variable insulting 
territorial integrity and state sovereignty, and poses threat on citizens security.  The impacts 
of climate change works “on a greater scale and with disastrous effects that will dwarf the 
invasions and raids of ancient times” (S/PV.5663, 8) and can erase whole nations from the 
map. Climate change is also threatening to put an end to sustainable development which will 
lead in alarming consequences for human security, endanger state institutions and breed 
crime and violence. The victims are ‘peace-loving’ nations that are left under a quiet onslaught 
of climate change by the richest and most powerful countries (S/PV.5663 (Res.), 8; S/PV.7499, 
29, 69). The victim is characterized with an inability to secure itself against climate change as 
it is other countries that is subjecting them under low-intensity biological or chemical warfare 
with their patterns of consumption that are destructive (S/PV.5663, 8, 31).  
The victims are dependent on the UNSC to carry out its Charter obligations and to “fully 
embrace the concept of environmental security within its mandate”, and not only as “a matter 
of identifying trouble spots where armed conflict may be linked to environmental decline” 




to. As a global security actor, it is the responsibility of the UNSC and the most powerful States 
leading it, to establish ambitious and legally binding agreements, and to use their legitimate 
power to put a greater international effort on ensuring the human and institutional capacity 
of the victims to deal with their threat of existence. It is a matter of solidarity, responsibility 
and legal obligation for the largest emitters and economically prosperous countries to act, as 
they by creating such an interconnected, pervasive and disastrous threat, have deprived the 
victims’ ability to secure themselves. For the victims security is about survival and 
exceptionalism, but only worsened by military solutions and separate national security 
policies. Climate security cannot be addressed or achieved without a recognition of the 
interconnectedness of global environmental, economic and security governance. The failure 
to acknowledge the interconnectedness between states and between the environmental, 
economic and security sector, has a result where “vulnerable countries have been left to 
shoulder the growing security burden with minimal assistance [and] [o]n every continent, the 
rich and the powerful contain the problems in ever higher barbed-wire fences” (S/PV.7499, 
70).   
The confrontational line rises between the victims and those large emitters who do not take 
their responsibilities in mitigating the threat of climate change. The Security Council must act 
as a security actor on behalf of the victims, as it is illustrated by a statement of one of the 
representatives of SIDS identifying to the subject position of a victim.   
In my frustration, I often wonder where we would be if the roles were reversed. 
What if the pollution coming from our island nations was threatening the very 
existence of the major emitters? What would be the nature of today’s debate be 
under those circumstances? But that is not the world that we live in, and this is 
not a hypothetical exercise for us. Many of our countries face the single greatest 
security challenge of all, that is, our survival. For that reason, we have come to 
the Security Council today. (S/PV.6587, 22.) 
The means in securing the existence of the victims implies financial and technological inputs 
from the developed nations to secure the sustainable development and thus ability to adapt. 
But it also implies significant reduction of emissions on behalf of the large emitters as for some 
as the low-lying island states, there is no amount of development that can save them from 
disappearing if the harmful emissions are not restricted (S/PV.7499, 76).  
Most of the victims, both in terms states and human living within them, are especially 




economic base and habitable land from small, low-lying and poverty ridden states. Climate 
change is thus a matter of sovereignty and territorial integrity for the victim states, and raises 
the question whether the world is “ready to accept the idea of a State without a territory?” 
(S/PV.6668, 6). Besides the large emitters, foreign investors, criminal groups, drug dealers and 
human traffickers are linked with the threat of losing sovereignty.  With its harmful effects on 
social and economic structures, climate change weakens governmental structures of these 
states, making them more vulnerable to external manipulation and capture. The threat is not 
military one but no less dangerous, and have at least as devastating consequences and can 
force whole nations to migrate, eventually forcing more secure States “to cope with the agony 
of human displacement of determined refugees and the consequences of the human misery 
of people flooding their borders on a quest for peace and security” (S/PV.7499, 32). 
 
Chain of equivalence and production of climate security discourse  
The articulations establish new relations among elements in security discourse modifying the 
identities and engendering new understandings of security. Even as the relation between 
climate change and security is produced differently within each articulation there are certain 
shared storylines that work as nodal points allowing these competing versions to be 
articulated as a relatively coherent whole (Rothe 2016, 161). The nodal points, hence, partially 
stabilize the discursive field so that a shared representation of security can be established 
within the climate security discourse coalition.  
Storylines of climate-induced migration, necessity of preventive and joint security efforts and 
sustainable development as a security strategy, are all accepted by the three (re)articulations. 
These storylines are crucial in structuring a new security landscape that reconceptualizes 
international security discourse in the frames of the UNSC. Surely, this reconceptualization 
does not occur in isolation from broader discursive shifts prevailing within wider context of 
global security politics7. David Chandler (2012a, 218–221; 2012b, 115), for example has argued 
that there has been a clear shift in international security order from the state-based 
territorialized language of intervention to the language of individual empowerment, freedom 
and capacity-building that is highly informed by the resilience paradigm. The focus of this 
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thesis, however, is restricted to the discursive struggles prevailing within the climate change 
debates of the UNSC.  
Shared Storyline: Climate induced migration 
Climate induced migration is linked in all the three articulations to the harmful and 
threatening consequences of climate change. A climate migrant or refugee represents a 
danger of distracted identity and failure of security governance. The people who are ripped 
out of their traditional living areas, communities and cultures are seen to face challenges in 
maintaining their identities, which are conceived to be highly dependent on the traditional 
homelands. Also the identities of the people in the receiving nations are seen to be facing a 
threat due to external intruders of large scale migration. Migration is presented as one of the 
most certain and worst consequences of climate change that not only threatens security, but 
is in itself a proof of the threatening nature of climate change. As the first example presents 
climate-induced migration more as a potential conflict trigger, the latter links it to the effects 
of climate change that are in themselves a threats to people and states.  
Climate change continues to act as a threat multiplier and risks triggering or 
exacerbating conflicts stemming from the consequences of sea-level rise, the 
depletion of natural resources, desertification, climate-induced migration and 
the crucial question of sustainable energy supply, just to mention some of the 
main challenges. (S/PV.6587 (Res.), 40–41.) 
Indeed, some of the adverse impacts of climate change include the gradual loss 
of land, floods, inundation, droughts, sea-level rise, increased salinity, extreme 
weather patterns, decreased food production, scarcity of fresh water and 
climate-induced migration (S/PV.6587 (Res.), 24–25). 
In all three (re)articulations the threat of climate change is very much conducted through 
dangerous migration. A migrant fleeting from unsecure homeland manifests the failure of a 
state to provide security for its citizens, the form of insecurity climate change is causing to 
human security and the shift from national to international and global level. The severity and 
acceleration of climate changes is indicating extensive population movements that need to be 
governed through global administration for mitigating the dangers posed on the migrant and 
on the transit and receiving nations.  
The climate-induced migration is also linked with many criminal acts such as human 
trafficking, narco-trade and terrorism that in turn have negative implications on international 




determinant of climate change. Climate change comes thus not only to the source of migration 
that is conceived as globally threatening phenomenon, but as a source of all the threats arising 
out of the large scale movement of people. By accelerating climate change will accelerate all 
these repercussions on global level, producing a threat that is commonly shared by all subject 
positions. The concept of climate migrant thus unites the narrow nation based security 
thinking and humanitarian concerns and symbolizes the ways in which climate change is 
forming a common threat to whole humanity.  
Shared Storyline: “The sad reality is that we cannot do this alone”8 
Another shared storyline within the three (re)articulations is that of climate change’s global 
character, which is resulting an inability of any state to secure itself against climate change. 
Most of the causes and effects of climate change are not something that can be administrated 
with border control mechanisms or by military means. Despite of how powerful the state is, 
its emission mitigation efforts cannot alone stop climatic change from accelerating, but 
cooperation and global governance is needed. Besides the participation of all states, the 
involvement of actors from civil and private sectors is seen as crucial in maintaining and 
establishing security against climate change.  
All the sectors in which climate change is causing changes, such as energy, economy and 
health, are highly interconnected, and most often sources of interdependency between states 
as well as between public and private sectors. It is thus acknowledged that the security 
mechanisms against climate change must be equally integrated and multifaceted, and cannot 
be restricted to states’ monopoly on force. In many cases states’ governing structures are seen 
as inefficient, or certain governments as invalid partners in global security governance, of why 
it is necessary to improve the subjectivity of other stakeholders in maintaining and building 
security. It is also necessity to take more global standpoint to the security policies in order to 
mitigate the future’s insecurities, or even the future as such. Security cannot be conceived 
only in national or international terms as it is increasingly impossible for a state, and eminently 
that of a developing state, to secure the lives and well-being of its citizens of which its own 
very survival is acknowledged to be dependent on. Disregarding global standpoint in states’ 
security policies is “a concrete example of the proverbial discarding one’s dirty water in the 
backyard of one’s neighbor” that will put the future of whole humanity at stake (S/PV.5663, 
                                                          




32).  The UNSC should work, not as a platform for states, but as a security actor who can 
ensure “the emergence and implementation of effective and timely solutions [in order] to 
provide peaceful responses that are based on shared values of respect for life, human dignity 
and the environment” (S/PV.7499, 64).  
This globality, pervasiveness and need for collective action is accepted within all the subject 
positions in the (re)articulations. Vulnerable states and individuals together with preventer 
states and victims presents climate change as a threat that overrides their capacities to fight 
against the threats they are posed to by climate change, without joint efforts on global scale. 
Even as the ways in which climate change manifests the threat to each subject position is 
differential, they are all undermined by the same source of threat and inability in longer run 
to secure against it on their one.   
Shared Storyline: Sustainable development as Security  
The third shared storyline presents sustainable development as the best way in securing 
security. Sustainable development forms a vital tool in maintenance of security that is 
threatened by non-sustainability and non-development. In all the levels — human, state, 
international and global — sustainable development is set as a precondition for a secure 
future. Sustainable development cluster brings together the vital ingredients of security, 
environmental protection and development. Sustainability is presupposed for stopping 
climate change from accelerating in a dangerous manner, when as development is conceived 
as a prerequisite for successful adaptation that is a necessity in protecting the well-being and 
lives of humans and states, and thus maintaining security on a global level.   Sustainable 
development is accepted as necessity for human security, which is in turn is broadly accepted 
as a precondition for a national and planetary security. Therefore, it is necessary to protect 
sustainable development from the threats brought about by climate change which “are 
primarily threats to sustainable development” (S/PV.5663, 9).   
Sustainable development is perceived as a way to reduce vulnerabilities behind human 
insecurities and provocation of conflicts and social unrest. Sustainable development 
governance is represented as a security technique that can prevent the actualization of many 
climate-related threats by addressing the root causes of these threats. Crucial feature of the 
sustainable development its ambiguity and vagueness that enables it to work as an answer to 




sustainable development as a precautionary measure that forestalls the emergence of 
environmental and social conditions triggering conflicts, when as human security approach 
acknowledges sustainable development primarily as a way  to enhance people’s capacities to 
adapt.  The articulation presenting climate change as an existential threat, finds sustainable 
development also as a way to improve their capacities, but also emphasizes the responsibility 
of major emitters to urgently shift their production patterns towards sustainable ways. 
Sustainable development is a prerequisite for peace and security and “the failure to maintain 
peace and security is a root cause for the absence of sustainable development” (S/PV.7499, 
49). 
The ambiguity and vagueness of sustainable development signifier enables it to be accepted 
as a universal tool that is holistic and precautionary, but leaves open the ways in which its 
implementation actually happens, and leaves it compatible with many different security 
discourses. It allows the articulation of diversifying referent objects and empowerment of 
multiply different security actors. Non-sustainability and non-development as the antagonistic 
frontiers of society enables all the different subject positions to share the storyline.  
 
Climate security as an empty signifier 
The effects of climate change are shattering the stability of existing social structures that do 
not manage to represent or explain the occurring events that leads to reactivation of deeply 
sedimented structures (Methmann 2010, 353–354). What this means is that the basic 
structures of security, which are built on state sovereignty and military power, are rendered 
into a contestation as the threat of climate change is not manageable through these old 
structures, but can only be accelerated by them. In this way, climate change represents the 
‘discursive outside’ that is disrupting the logic of security by systemically linking the 
traditionally conceived means of security to the sources of new insecurities. Climate change 
discourse relates the growth of threats to globally non-administered and separate security 
policies, and to the narrow security approach, which fails to acknowledge the 
interconnectedness of different sectors and actors. It is thus seen that“[s]ecurity policies 
exclusively based on national sovereignty appear less and less appropriate in this context” of 
climate change, as they obstruct the necessary precautionary action and creates insecurities 




The discourse of climate security as a hegemonic project contesting the meaning of security, 
is based on the construction of a chain of equivalence.  In the chain of equivalence different 
political demands are united under one hegemonic demand representing them all. Like the 
theory of hegemony posit, the articulation of an antagonisms is a prerequisite for the 
construction of a chain, which results that a political discourse is always characterized, on one 
the hand, with the articulation of social antagonism that reveals the limits of the social 
structure, and the common good and ways to enhance it on the other (Rothe 2016, 70). The 
three (re)articulations of security, presented above, embody many heterogeneous demands 
that can in some points even be contradictory. The logic of equivalence is diluting these 
internal differences through construction of a common threat (Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 114).  
This means that the common orientation towards climate change and security, does not mean 
that the coalition build through equivalential chain is marked with an overall consensus (see 
Rothe 2016, 151). The empty signifier, that is the hegemonic demand, represents all the 
demands that has been attached to it, and the non-being of the elements that have been 
excluded, and has itself been ‘emptied’ of any particular content (see Laclau 2005, 69–71; 
Methmann 2010, 353).  
Constructing climate change as a universal threat 
In first articulation climate change presents a threat to vulnerable states through creating 
environmental conditions that together with insufficient governmental capacities produces a 
national security threat. Climate change increases the stress on state institutions by bringing 
about scarcities of vital resources and causing resource management problems, deteriorating 
food and energy security, undermining livelihoods and increasing poverty, instability and 
forced migration, which are all forming a fertile grounds for an outbreak of conflict within and 
cross the borders. Security is obtained through institutional capacity-building, where the 
vulnerable are aided by financial, technological and scientific support that enables them to 
build institutional structures to overcome the environmental changes without a radical 
decline in societies’ well-being, which would endanger states’ security, and spread into 
international level. Climate change is brought from environmental problem to a problem of 
governing and maintaining stability, through which it is understood as a root cause of conflicts. 
What blocks the being of security is the non-capacity to face the effects of climate change. 




For preventer states the fragility and possible collapse of vulnerable countries constructs a 
threat of spreading of the conflicts and having to face a large scale movement of people that 
can violate their identity and bring “ethnic power struggles” (S/PV.5663 (Res.), 15). The 
capacity-building of vulnerable states is thus seen as a common good, which is best enhanced 
through securing the sustainable development of the vulnerable states. Helping the more 
vulnerable to develop, is taken out of a mere economic — and even normative— context and 
linked to national interest of preventer states. Climate change not just aggravate and foment 
conflicts, but increases “climate-change-related poverty” that breeds “recruitment by rebel or 
terrorist groups” (S/PV.5663, 4). Also ‘statelessness’, ‘migratory pressure’ and ‘cultural 
mortality’ caused by climate change that are linked with lost coherence, hatred, instability and 
alienation, can spread borderlessly in globally integrated and networked world, increasing risk 
of spread out instability and violence.   
Ensuring and promoting sustainable development for vulnerable states is also connected to 
the protection of the most vulnerable people and whole humanity. “Threats brought about by 
climate change do not loom over vulnerable States exclusively but are primarily threats to 
sustainable development” that is a universal tool to secure the common future (S/PV.5663, 
9). The various insecurities arising from climate change, from the perspective of human 
security, are interconnected with the security of a state as fragile and insufficient resource 
management institutions foment inequalities and decline of environmental conditions 
increasing these insecurities even further. There is therefore a double effect as climate 
change, through creating multiple struggles for individuals to maintain their decent living 
conditions and well-being, causes stress on state institutions, the weak institutions further 
feed the insecurities.   
Security against climate change is thus presented as a universal concern through an 
equivalential chain that unites the diversifying demands through articulating climate change 
as an antagonistic other, and links the subject positions into a joint project of fighting the 
common enemy. Climate security is extend into adjacent spheres so that it becomes to 
symbolize the demands of human, national and international security. It also takes the form 
of a master threat as it overwhelms the capacities of individual security actors and creates an 
image of chaotic and insecure future, if the joint project is missed. Climate change is described 




manifests how “nature rebels against humans” (ibid., 12), and “acts as a threat multiplier” 
(S/PV.6587 (Res.), 22, emphasis added) that “will intensify already existing global challenges, 
exacerbate water and food scarcity, and cause a range of other shocks and stresses, some of 
which will be highly unpredictable and abrupt” (S/PV.6587 (Res.), 28).   
This construction of dangerous climate change as a collective enemy uniting the subject 
positions, also constructs humanity as a collective identity, and sets it as a referent object that 
is sought to be protected. Climate change do not only deepen existing social antagonisms 
within societies, but own the potential to destroy the whole societies, and eventually that of 
humanity. Climate change constructs a threat in terms of in terms of “cultural and geographic 
mortality” (S/PV.5663 (Res.), 25). Climate change is “a security challenge that has the capacity 
to wipe out whole nations and whole cultures and indeed wipe out life as we know it today 
on this planet”(S/PV.7499, 29). It is not a sovereignty, but the whole existence of humanity as 
such, which need to be protected. Security is survival, but also stability, which presupposes 
maintaining decent living conditions on global level by reducing the vulnerabilities. It is also 
securing the right for identity, which is most often articulated through a universal right for 
nationhood9 and culture. Where this claim departs from the traditional security discourse’s 
claim for nationhood, is in that the security can only be provided by externally aided capacity 
building and mitigation efforts on behave of both public and private sector actors. Like one of 
the representatives of the victims illustrate as he states that what they are asking for is “to be 
given the chance by the rest of our global family to live on in our own islands and to guarantee 
that we can still say “kia orana10” long into the future” (S/PV.7499, 42). 
The collective security is best enhanced through prevention and adaptation that are most 
often linked to sustainable development. Sustainable development is at the heart of climate 
security, as it seen to reduce the vulnerabilities and to enhance the adaptive capacity and thus 
preventing mass migration and violent conflict. Climate change is articulated as a matter of 
‘high politics’ but the adaptation of exceptional measures is taking the form of bolstering 
sustainable development through partnership and global governance. The representatives of 
states as a leaders of global community must institute this action with great urgency or 
                                                          
9 There is no contradiction in identifying with both subject positions as far as they are not an antagonistic 
relation, but equivalented through common enemy (See Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 43; Laclau & Mouffe 2001, 
103, 107; Rothe 2016, 166).    




“humanity will have to face unprecedented challenges of an inconceivable magnitude” 
(S/PV.5663 (Res.), 9). 
The role of the Security Council  
Securitization of climate change through articulating climate change as the antagonistic other 
bears two stances over the role of the UNSC in global security governance. For many 
vulnerable states the Security Council represents the international structure from the time of 
its founding owning the old power structures and inheriting military and sanction based tools, 
which are not appropriate to handle the new non-traditional security threats. Especially the 
exclusive nature of the Council which concentrates power to the ‘largest emitters’ is seen 
makes it unacceptable to the Council to take action toward global and complex threat of 
climate change. Due to the power structure favoring the largest emitters it is questioned 
whether “is it possible for the Security Council to adopt resolutions on sanctions or reparations 
that effectively hold those countries responsible for the damage they are causing?” 
(S/PV.6587 (Res.), 26).  
The Security Council is representing invalid agent to address universal threat as it enables 
drawing of nationalistic interests of the permanent members. The increasing military 
expenditures of the permanent members is raised to exemplify the hypocritical position of the 
Council in debating the non-traditional threat that strikes primarily on the most vulnerable. 
“A first positive step would be to significantly reduce military expenses and to allocate those 
resources to a fund to tackle the impacts of climate change in developing countries” 
(S/PV.6587 (Res.), 26). But even as the lack of universal human security based approach is set 
as the reason for the Security Council’s inappropriateness, it is often the state based ‘common 
but differentiated responsibilities11’ that is seen as threatened by the actions of the Security 
Council. The Security Council is feared to use punitive measures which can hinder the 
development of some of the vulnerable countries. 
Especially for those of the preventers, the Security Council forms an appropriate and crucial 
part of the United Nation’s governing structure that enables versatile and effective action. The 
                                                          
11 “In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but 
differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the 
international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global 





Security Council conceived to provide urgency to the problem, and to provide authority to 
other bodies of the UN. Even as partnership is presented as the most attractive mechanism to 
implement adaptation measures, the UN is presented as vital actor in ensuring the global 
efficiency and coordination. Here, the agency of security actor is rather decentralized than 
centralized. The prevention of catastrophic future and negative effects of climate change is 
mutual work of whole humanity, as the insecurities of those more vulnerable constitutes 
insecurities for those less vulnerable. Like the following statement exemplifies: 
[S]ecurity risks and vulnerabilities are interrelated, which constitutes in itself an 
additional threat to stability and must be addressed in a comprehensive and 
collaborative way. These risks and vulnerabilities equally require the 
involvement of all actors and concerned stakeholders. (S/PV.7499, 54) 
The Security Council thus an important coordinator or platform in orchestrating and uniting 
the collective efforts. 
The third role given to the Security Council can be found from the articulation of victims, which 
is here presented separately, as it shares the storylines structuring the evolving discourse of 
climate security, but is constructing common identity of the political community through 
refining the antagonistic point. What is addressed is the agency behind climate change. It is 
those who are causing the danger of climate change through inaction and refusal that are 
formed as the antagonistic other. The causers are not conceived through historical 
responsibility, but are those forestalling the needed prevention measures, and blocking the 
Security Council’s possibilities to fulfill its mandate, that are causing the danger for victims.  
“Yet all that is needed for those multifaceted threats to become complex and contagious 
sources of global instability is the inaction of powerful multilateral partners”12 
While the rest of the world debates the implications of climate change, we in 
the small islands and atolls of the Pacific are having to deal with the problem, 
because it is already upon us” (S/PV.7499, 35).  
The meetings were held between 2007 and 2015, and there is a shift that can be discerned in 
defining climate change as a future threat towards an emphasize that the“[d]angerous climate 
change is already occurring” (S/PV.6587 (Res), 28). Especially in the arguments of victims the 
cruel reality of dangerous climate change is already occurring. Destructive storms and dying 
reefs are used as examples of how the victims are already suffering from the dangerous effects 
                                                          




of climate change. Climate change is presented as a source of present difficulties with food 
and health security, loss of traditional ways of life and increased criminality.  
Climate change is linked to unfairness, as the victims are the ones to experience the power of 
climate change to destroy the whole existence of societies, even they have not contributed 
for its outset. The ability to provide their own security is ripped off from the victims, and it is 
“morally and ethically unacceptable for the international community to fail to respond” to the 
global meltdown that causes hunger, poverty, and eventually extinction of the vulnerable 
states (S/PV.6587 (Res.), 28). Climate change is described as “an unprovoked war being 
waged” against the victims (S/PV.5663, 32). “Climate change is a global threat, not an abstract 
concern”, which threatens the existence of the victims through refusal of some to see it as 
such and refusing to carry their responsibilities (S/PV.6587, 24). Climate change itself is 
reduced from its agency and the common identity is structured through those not taking part 
to fight against climate change. Climate change is rather conceived as a weapon that that is 
used through blocking global effective action to defend from it in terms of mitigation and 
adaptation. It is the existing global security and economic structures that are responsible of 
the current situation. It is the deficiencies in global environmental governance, global 
economic governance and global security governance that are at the root of the security 
challenges faced by the victims, which is the outcome of the failure in acknowledging the 
interdependence of these areas.  
To fulfill its responsibilities “[t]he Council must look at issues of international peace and 
security through the lens of the present tense by redefining its understanding of security to 
be in line with today’s realities, as non-traditional causes of the difficulties in maintaining 
peace and security are plentiful”. ”The root causes of the difficulties in maintaining 
international peace and security are no longer drawn from traditional definitions of security, 
as those root causes have evolved over the years into what might be considered non-
traditional causes. The lines are blurred between the traditional realpolitik of the past and 
today’s more complex notions of non-traditional definitions of security”. (S/PV.7499, 49.) It is 
continuously urged that the UNSC must broaden and redefine its approach to security and 
“institutionalize the threat of climate change on its agenda” (S/PV.7499, 59). It is the states 




the UNSC to fulfilling its responsibilities to maintain security and peace, that are causing the 
threat for humanity.  
It is addressed that while the international community debates on whether or not climate 
change can constitutes a threat, coastal areas are disappearing and lives suffering in the 
societies of the victims. The inability to act as a subject of security against dangerous climate 
change, constructs the UNSC as a securing subject. The UNSC is conceived as a global 
conductor who has the power and responsibility to establish more effective security 
structures to secure the humanity.  The UNSC is rather conceived as a representative of the 
UN that a platform of exclusive number of state representatives. Like the following statement 
illustrates: “The Security Council ultimately acts for the whole Organization, not solely on 
behalf of narrow interests, and it has full power to investigate any situation that could lead to 
international friction so as to better understand the possible danger to international peace 
and security” S/PV.7499, 75). It is understood as a representative and authority of global, 
rather than international, community. 
 
Protecting the hegemony 
The discourse coalition around securitizing climate change presented above, shares the 
understanding of climate change as a security issue. In the discourse coalition the security 
signifier is taken out of its conventionalized military context and related to development and 
humanitarian problems. An equivalential chain is produced between different vulnerabilities 
of individuals and societies against a threat of chaotic and dangerous future, and potential 
destruction of humanity, brought about by climate change. Vulnerabilities are not only causes 
of human insecurities, but also triggers of conflicts and migratory flows. Security is rather 
conceived in terms of sustaining peace in transformation, than as maintaining any stable state 
of security. Security as sustaining peace, requires “a pre-emptive response” instead of a 
reaction that in the face of global and pervasive threat of climate change, can be too late 
(S/PV.7499, 31).  
However, there are attempts to break the chain of equivalence and to channel the grievances 
and social demands into already existing hegemonic structures. This is done by keeping the 
demands separate, which is preventing the establishment of discourse coalitions, or by 




200, 107). The unified demand for climate security is separated into multiple different 
demands that need to be addressed separately. For example, it is stated that there “is a more 
relevant, stronger link between climate change and development as opposed to security 
(S/PV.5663 (Res.), 20), and climate change will turn into an international security threat only 
if the international community “fail to deal with climate change as a sustainable development 
issue” (S/PV.5663 (Res.), 9). Climate change ”is in essence an issue of sustainable 
development” (S/PV.5663, 12).  Here the link between sustainable development and security 
is detached. Climate change is articulated as a sustainable development and not a security 
issue.  
The role of hunger, poverty and competition for scarce resources, and climate change’s 
potential to aggravate the disputes, is acknowledged in some arguments, but the 
straightforward link between them is denied. These are conceived as separate dangers that 
must be addressed separately through developmental and environmental governance that fall 
out of the mandate of international security governance. Since climate change do not form an 
independent factor in conflicts, its contribution can be addressed only separately in the 
context of each the conflict situation. It is empathized that ”[e]nvironmental impacts do not 
threaten international peace and security on their own”( S/PV.6587, 8) nor is climate change 
“a threat in the context of Article 39 of the Charter” (S/PV.5663 (Res.), 21). The Article 39 
states that “[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance”(the UN Charter 1945).  
The effects of climate change on human and energy security are separated from international 
security. Welfare and energy politics of state are a domestic issues that, only if combined with 
military power, can be seen as a concern for international security. The urgent need for 
emission reduction is best achieved on behalf of development states, who are the most 
responsible of climate change. The responsibility cannot be thrusted into the shoulders of 
developing states as they have a legitimate aspiration to pursue development for achievement 
of United Nations Millennium Development Goals13, and for adapting to the environmental 
                                                          
13 “The United Nations Millennium Development Goals were 8 goals that all 189 UN Member States have 
agreed to try to achieve by the year 2015. The United Nations Millennium Declaration, signed in September 
2000, committed world leaders to combat poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and 




changes. The adaptation should be financially aided by the developed states through 
developmental and humanitarian aid, which is built on voluntary partnership. Like the 
following statement by one of the deniers of climate threat illustrates: “We call on all 
interested donor countries to consider the possibility of providing, on an urgent and targeted 
basis, aid to the countries concerned for the purpose of adaptation” (S/PV.6587, 13). Security 
measures are only needed if maladaptation leads to large scale violence or the trend of 
aggressive interference into the internal affairs of sovereign States continues. The 
encroachment of the Security Council into the environmental, social and economic sectors is 
conceived illegitimate, and climate change must be addressed within bodies representing 
these separate sectors.  
It is the security framing of climate change that can pose a threat to international security, not 
climate change itself.  Security, and especially international security, is to be approached 
through military or conflict centered security, where sovereign state is conceived as the basic 
unit. The transition into low-carbon economy must be achieved through financial and 
technological aid that does not form a threat to the sovereignty or developmental goals of 
states, which would potentially lead to military involvement. The security framing of climate 
change was also argued to bring forth unnecessary politicization and disagreement between 
countries, which would only hinder the actions taken in order to tackle climate change.  The 
complexity and unequal distribution of the effects of climate change necessitates approaching 
the problem through the context of each state in concern. The possible (but not evident) 
security implications of climate change can only be investigated within universal body, where 
each state can decide what action on their behalf is appropriate.   
 
UN Security Council Presidential Statement 6587th 
The debate held in 2007 was not able to result a resolution or statement, bur was 
groundbreaking contribution to the climate security discourse and to the transformation of 
the discursive field.  In 2011 more states had shifted from climate security deniers to identify 
with the subject positions of climate security discourse, and were therefore participating in 
securitizing of climate change. In comparison to the 2007 meeting, the number of both the 
                                                          
Agenda for Sustainable Development, which increased the number of goals to 17 and puts more emphasis on 




participating states, and those in favor of an active role of the Security Council in addressing 
climate change-related insecurity, increased notably in 2011 (Cousins 2013, 203).  
The presidential statement was adopted as an outcome of the meeting held under the heading 
impact of climate change. Even as it did not lead to an adaptation of any significant action, its 
acceptance acted as a symbol of widening of the understanding of security within the Security 
Council. In the statement the Security Council addresses that climate change is principally a 
sustainable development issue of which main responsibility is conferred upon General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, but acknowledges that “possible adverse 
effects of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to 
international peace and security,” and “notes that in matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security under its consideration, conflict analysis and contextual 
information on, inter alia, possible security implications of climate change is important, when 
such issues are drivers of conflict, represent a challenge to the implementation of Council 
mandates or endanger the process of consolidation of peace” (S/PRST/2011/15).  
Even as the statement felt short in recognizing climate change as a threat to international 
peace and security, it did acknowledge that climate change has security implications. It 
recognized climate change as a potential factor in conflicts and as an exacerbator of already 
existing security threats. Together with the ethos of prevention, which was also stressed in 
the statement, this recognition of the interconnectedness of environmental, social and 
security sectors builds stronger emphasis on non-traditional sources of security threats. 
Environmental and social governance are, thus, linked to conflict prevention. What it means 
is that climate change mitigation (of emissions) and adaptation are not irrelevant in 
maintaining peace and security, but connected to the outset of conflicts and exacerbation of 
‘certain existing threats’. However, the possibility of the Security Council to investigate the 
potential climate-related security threats is tied in to a contextual approach. This gives space 
for conceiving adaptation measures as a part of a conflict prevention strategy, but leaves out 
the global emission mitigation efforts. This may result from fear of the Security Council using 
its punitive and legally binding measures in a way they would endanger states’ ‘legitimate 
aspiration for development’ as discussed above.  
The statement also acknowledges ”that possible security implications of loss of territory of 




implications arising from sea-level rise are, is left open. This ambiguous language used in the 
statement do not link security strictly to warfare and conflicts, but allows articulation of non-
traditional security threats. However, the demand for global perspective central in climate 
security discourse, is highly disregarded in favor of a state sovereignty. The potential security 
implications of climate change are passed somewhere into the future, where they may occur 
if climate change is failed to be addressed as a developmental problem. The normative 
aspiration of the Security Council to protect populations from crimes against humanity and 
genocide, is still highly dependent on traditional security discourse. But the ability of the 
Security Council to agree on a presidential statement over climate change is demonstrating 




In order to answer the question of how climate change is constructed as a threat in the United 
Nations Security Council, I studied the ways in which security is understood within the Security 
Council. I investigated who or what is threatened by climate change, how they are threatened 
and what needs to be done and by whom, to be secured from the threat. Using 
poststructuralist approach that provided tools and theorizations for analyzing and 
understanding how discourses structure the world we are living in, I traced the signification 
chains behind the production of meaning. I found four different understandings of security, of 
which three differ from the traditional understanding of security where security is conceived 
as a state’s ability to withstand aggression from abroad.  In the traditional understanding of 
security climate change itself is not recognized as a threat, but can only form a threat through 
others states’ or the Security Council’s aggressive interference into domestic politics of 
another state. In this understanding, what needs to be protected is the state sovereignty.  
In one of the other understandings, security is conceived as an absence of conflict, which do 
not always occur between states, but also within them. State is the main object to be secured, 
but the necessity to secure decent living conditions for populations is acknowledged. Neither 
national nor international security cannot exist if citizens are facing large scale hardships to 




degradation and loss of land, which can engender poverty, migration and social unrest that 
are potential breeding grounds for conflicts. Climate change is seen as a root cause of conflicts 
by engendering environmental conditions that changes in livelihoods and causes pressure on 
governmental capacities of states and international institutions. Failed resource and 
population management on national and international level results conflicts that can spread 
across the world.  
Security is also conceived in terms of human well-being and dignity. Security-insecurity is 
defined in relation to vulnerabilities that causes human suffering and (unnecessary) loss of 
lives. Security means safety from threats that arise from a great variety of sources and 
threaten the vital cores of human lives. Poverty, hunger, diseases and environmental disasters 
are threats that people need to be protected from. Security is fulfillment of human rights and 
capabilities to adapt to environmental and socio-economic changes, without jeopardizing 
well-being or lives of people. Climate change exacerbates and multiplies these vulnerabilities, 
endangering human rights and thus increasing human insecurity.  
The fourth definition of security is related to cultural rights, global equality and survival. 
Security is the ability to survive in geographical and cultural terms. It is also safety from human 
insecurities, which is a precondition for cultural survival. Security can only be provided 
through global responsibility and coordination. Security is not a freedom of war, but freedom 
from sea-level rise and destruction of biodiversity, and preparedness for environmental 
disasters. With all implications, climate change itself endangers traditional ways of lives, 
devastates states and threatens the lives of the people. What threatens security is not warfare 
in traditional sense, but biological and chemical outputs that are accelerating climate change.  
These different understandings of security that acknowledge climate change as a security 
problem, merged in many points. In all three latter definitions climate change is conceived as 
a security issue that cannot to be tackled by separate security policies, requiring joint efforts. 
Cooperation and multilateral action are prerequisite for maintaining security in all levels and 
perspectives. Global governance is needed, as it does not matter where the harmful emissions 
are produced, they still have the same effect on global climate change. The global character 
of climate change is also a crucial feature in climate-induced migration, which is commonly 
recognized as a dangerous consequence of climate change. In all definitions climate migrant 




common mean to fight against climate change is sustainable development. Sustainable 
development is conceived as a way to reduce vulnerabilities of humans and states alike. It is 
also a vital tool to provide security for those facing an existential threat due to climate change. 
Climate change is thus conceived as a common threat of whole humanity.  
Each of the signification chains offer differential subject positions from where the 
representatives of states speak from. These subject positions represent differential political 
communities which are seen as threatened. Coalition-building through commonly shared 
storylines as presented above, make climate security function as an empty signifier. Empty 
signifier represents an empty place unifying a set of equivalential demands (Laclau 1995, 155). 
In the situation of climate insecurity, climate security is present as that which is absent. 
Climate security thus represents the equivalential relation between various demands such as 
environmental protection, sustainable development, food security, energy security and 
equality.  
To be able to seek an answer to the question of how does the construction of climate change 
as a threat affect the traditional understanding of security, I analyzed the how the hegemonic 
discursive structure of security was defended. In the defensive hegemonic project the chain 
of equivalence was intercept by addressing the differences between demands. Environmental 
protection, human development and security were detached from each other and articulated 
as separate demands. The demands were also merged into the already existing structures by 
articulating that climate change is most effectively addressed through environmental and 
sustainable development governance and not through security, which would politicizes the 
problem further and bring forth more obstacles for cooperation. The equivalential relation 
between human and international security was also separated into non-relation and the well-
being of people is seen to be secured through developmental aid that is based on voluntary 
partnership. Security framing of climate change was seen inconvenient as the security tools 
are inappropriate in addressing complex problems such as climate change, but are designed 
to combat military threats.   
A presidential statement that was agreed on at the second meeting on climate change, 
acknowledges that in the longer run, climate change may aggravate already existing security 
threats and have negative effects on the consolidation of peace, but defines climate change 




recognized to potentially have security implications for some states, but sea-level rise as such 
is missed to be conceived as a threat. The necessity of cooperation and integrated response, 
crucial for climate security, is recognized, but is stated to be accomplished through relevant 
organs of the United Nations, such as General Assembly and ECOSOC, that own appropriate 
mandates. The presidential statement emphasizes the importance of cooperation between 
these institutional bodies and requests the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council 
with contextual information of possible security implications of climate change.  
It seems that rather than the Security Council extending its area of operation radically out of 
the military sphere, actors from social, environmental and economic sectors are seen 
increasingly important in maintaining peace. The exacerbating nature of climate change that 
is proceeding toward total disorder, both challenges and justifies the central position of 
weaponry within security thinking. Conceiving climate change as a threat demands radical 
transformation in the security tools, as that what needs to be fought against is environmental 
conditions overrunning the capacity of societies to adapt. But if climate change is seen simply 
as an exacerbator of already existing threats, it paints a picture of more conflict prone and 
socially unstable future, which also emphasizes the importance of military power.  
Climate change does not only cause environmental changes, but has an effect on economic 
and social structures. Climate change symbolizes the globalized and interconnected nature of 
today’s world, where sates’ capabilities to control the economic and social spheres have 
degreased. Actors from private sector and civil society are increasingly seen as active partners 
in maintaining peace and security. Global consensus is seen as crucial, while the separate 
security policies of states are seen helplessly insufficient. Threats are increasingly seen to lack 
clear defined geographical or temporal parameters, which is highlighting the need of united 
preventative action. What seems to be hindering these efforts is the inequality in the 
magnitude of experienced negative effects and in demanded mitigation efforts. Those who 
are geographically and economically better positioned see climate change as a developmental 
problem that in the future can have security implications, when as those more vulnerable 
conceive climate change to be far more dangerous. 
On the state level, there is a division between vulnerable or fragile and ‘non-vulnerable’. 
Fragile and vulnerable states and societies suffering from climate change are potential 




states deny their responsibilities and deteriorating global actions are aggravating and 
producing threats to vulnerable states. Global action is vital for security against climate 
change, which is conceived rather as a continuous process of adaptation and peace-building 
than a target or stabilized state. Sustainability is recognized vital for security, but it is more 
often understood as a sustainable development for the future than as a matter of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions with immediate action. This is not that surprising taking into 
account that the Security Council is highly exclusive body that gives more power to less 
vulnerable and highly industrialized states, such as the United States, Russia and China.  
I would argue that there is clear, even if only a minor shift in the meaning of security from 
being the defense of states sovereignty and territorial integrity, to the protection against 
vulnerabilities and the maintenance of global stability. Climate change is widely seen as a 
global threat demanding global response, instead of an international one. The effect of the 
discourse of human security and the idea of equal and common security for a humanity can 
be identified as prevailing within the debates. There is also an urge to better acknowledge 
threats that operate out of conflict centered perspectives. But this global framing also causes 
defenses over state sovereignty that is seen to be threatened by the demands of global 
governance structures and acknowledgement of more human security based threats. This 
understanding of climate change as a global threat does not stop the traditional security logics 
from working, but undermines its hegemonic position. Like it was stated by on representative 
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